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DRAFT – October 2012
BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson*
Abstract
Observers of our federal republic have long
acknowledged that a fourth branch of government comprising
administrative agencies has arisen to join the original three
established by the Constitution. In this article, we focus our
attention on the emergence of perhaps yet another,
comprising financial self-regulatory organizations. In the late
eighteenth century, long before the creation of state and
federal securities authorities, the financial industry created its
own self-regulatory organizations. These private institutions
then coexisted with the public authorities for much of the past
century in a complementary array of informal and formal
policing mechanisms. That equilibrium, however, appears to
be growing increasingly imbalanced, as financial SROs such
as FINRA transform from “self-regulatory” into “quasigovernmental” organizations.
We describe this change through an account that
describes how SROs are losing their independence, growing
distant from their industry members, and accruing
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers that more
closely resemble governmental agencies such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.
We then consider the
confluence of forces that might be driving this increasingly
governmental shift, including among others, demographic
changes in the style and size of retail investments in the
securities markets, the one-way ratchet effect of high-publicity
failures and scandals, and the public choice incentives of
regulators and the compliance industry.
The process by which such self-regulatory organizations
shed their independence for an increasingly governmental
role is an undesirable but largely inexorable development,
and we offer some initial ideas for how to forestall it.

* Respectively, Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of
Law and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Funding for this
paper was provided through a grant from the CME Group Foundation, which
was established by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Trust.
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Government [should] keep the shotgun, so to
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled,
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it
would never have to be used.
– SEC Chair William O. Douglas,
describing his vision of self-regulation,
immediately prior to joining the Supreme
Court.1
Is FINRA becoming a “deputy SEC”?
– SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher.2

I. INTRODUCTION
Observers of our federal republic have long argued
that a fourth branch of government, comprising
administrative agencies born of the New Deal, has
arisen to join the original three established by the
Constitution. 3 In this article, we argue that another
branch
–
comprising
financial
self-regulatory
organizations – is emerging due to a confluence of
forces, which we attempt to identify and describe. The
process by which such organizations exchange their
independence for an increasingly governmental role is
an undesirable but largely inexorable development. We
therefore offer some initial ideas for how to forestall it.
Many historians trace the rise of the fourth
branch to New Deal legislation that created a variety of

1

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940).
Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, Market 2012: Time for a Fresh
Look at Equity Market Structure and Self-Regulation, Speech to SIFMA’s 15th
Annual Market Structure Conference, Oct. 4, 2012.
3
The origin of the “headless fourth branch” phrase was a 1937 report
commissioned by President Roosevelt. Report of the President’s Committee on
Administrative Management 7, 83 (1937). See also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470, 487-89 (1952) (Jackson, dissenting) (“Administrative bodies . . . have
become a veritable fourth branch of the government, which has deranged our
three-branch legal theories.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573 (1984).
2
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new administrative agencies.4 These rule making and
adjudicating bodies staffed with experts have given rise
to great academic discussion over the past eight
decades. 5 Notwithstanding these debates, few would
disagree that the vast majority of federal regulatory
tasks are undertaken by the host of administrative
agencies in Washington,6 and that courts give these
agencies broad deference in rulemaking because of
their expertise on matters within their ambit. 7
Congress delegated its authority in broad strokes
to allow specialists in various fields, such as finance,
aviation, and the environment, to fill in the regulatory
details based on practical experience and knowledge.8
The Securities Exchange Commission is just such an
agency. Assigned the task of protecting investors and
regulating financial markets in the public interest, the
SEC was vested with attributes of the other three
branches: it promulgates rules, it enforces those rules,
and it sits in judgment of individuals and institutions
alleged to have violated those rules.9
Although
staffed
with
experts,
these
administrative agencies are nevertheless one step
removed from the markets and firms that they
regulate. And because of the realities of governmental
4

See, e.g., Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (Princeton, 1990); Alan Brinkley, THE END
OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (Vintage, 1996);

James T. Kloppenberg, Who’s Afraid of the Welfare State?, 18 Reviews in
American History 395 (1990).
5
Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE
CONSTITUTION (2006) with Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573 (1984); see generally Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a
Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007).
6
Familiar examples include the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), and Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
7
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
8
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING
THE REGULATORY STATE (1993).
9
For a description of the SEC, see http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml. For one of the definitive histories of the SEC, which
describes these features, their origins, and their change over time, see JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed.) (2003).

4

BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH
budgets and the dynamics of bureaucratic entities,
many commentators argue that the agencies have long
been understaffed and outgunned.10 This imbalance is
especially acute in the world of finance, where the
pecuniary stakes are so high for private parties that
governmental agencies by themselves have always
seemed overwhelmed. To give just one example, nearly
seventy years elapsed before the SEC established a
division to keep abreast of the latest Wall Street
innovations: a law professor, not a financier, was
assigned to head it, assisted by just a handful of staff
to keep up with the armies of innovators deployed on
Wall Street.11
In the area of finance, where this imbalance is
particularly potent, the fourth branch of government
has operated for decades in tandem with various
purely private bodies that also regulate the behavior of
financial
professionals.
These
member-based
regulatory entities long preceded any government
regulation of financial markets.12 Direct legal
regulation of financial markets is a product of the early
twentieth century: state legislation first appeared with
Kansas’s blue-sky law of 1911,13 and the federal
securities laws were passed from 1933 to 1940.14
Private regulation, in contrast, is a product of the late
eighteenth century.15 The early stock exchanges in
New York were formed privately as early as 1792
primarily as a means to impose private, member-based
type of regulation upon the nascent financial
industry.16 (These early efforts were based on British
10
See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, Headaches at the SEC’s Think Tank,
Reuters, May 3, 2011 (describing the early results from the Division of Risk,
Strategy, and Financial Innovation, which was designed to keep abreast of the
latest innovations on Wall Street).
11
For a description of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial
Innovation, see http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-199.htm.
12
See infra, Section II.
13
1911 Kans. Sess. Laws 210.
14
15 U.S.C. §§78a-78pp (2006 & Supp. I 2009), et seq.
15
For a general history, see SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET, supra note __.
16
STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION:
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practices going back even further.)17 By creating a
more secure forum in which to trade securities, the
industry – or at least the members of the exchanges –
aspired to improve their business by excluding
unreliable,
uncreditworthy,
and
unscrupulous
brokers.
When federal law did arrive, it borrowed heavily
from these private regulatory agencies, officially
christened self-regulatory organizations (SROs).18
During the New Deal era, the New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities
Dealers both were given a significant role to continue
their regulatory mission in conjunction with
administrative agencies.19 According to a leading
history of the SEC, the SROs “retain[ed] the initial
responsibility for preventing fraud or unfairness, both
because [they] could act swiftly and more subtly than
a government bound by due process standards and
could avoid the ‘bureaucratic blight’ of too intrusive a
government police force.”20
For some of the past eight or so decades, these
private police officers of our financial system have
operated solely on the private side of the
government/private border.21 But the story we tell in
this article is one of change. We describe several
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860, 171-75 (1998). See also Claire
Priest and Bruce Mann on early American financial law: e.g., Priest, Currency
Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303
(2001); Mann, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT (1987).
17
See BANNER, supra note __.
18
For stockbrokers, the SRO is now called FINRA, which is a
combination of the regulatory arms of the NYSE and NASD. See, e.g., Speech
by SEC Chairman: Statement at News Conference Announcing NYSE-NASD
Regulatory
Merger,
Nov.
28,
2006,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch112806cc.htm.
19
See § 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78o3(3)(1). According to Paul Mahoney, the NASD originated as a trade association
of investment banks in 1912. Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the
Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23-24 (2001).
20
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note __ at 158
(quoting William O. Douglas).
21
See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005).
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mechanisms that appear to be driving the “self” out of
financial SROs, rendering them ever more quasigovernmental in nature. Moreover, this process of
“governmentalization” appears to be accelerating. In
one of the most recent instances, the MF Global
debacle quickly prompted a report from the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the
administrative agency charged with regulating
commodities markets), which called for reforms that
would increase the direct governmental role of
derivatives SROs, such as the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange.22 Whether they fully appreciate it or not,
financial SROs are transforming into a fifth branch of
government.
In this article, we explore the factors that may be
contributing to this increasing governmentalization of
SROs.23 Indeed, the MF Global case illustrates at least
one such mechanism behind the increasing puissance
and governmentalization of SROs: many SRO “failures”
are addressed with awards of greater power to their
governmental regulator and threats of dissolution of
the SRO, while SRO “successes” are largely ignored.
This one-way ratchet reinforces the idea that, for an
SRO, self-preservation may demand more aggression –
that is, behaving more like the government – within its
jurisdiction, even when other prudential concerns may
not warrant such a reaction.
Proponents of heightened financial regulation may
celebrate the prospect of more powerful and
governmental SROs, while those who favor less
governmental intrusion will lament it. In this article,
we argue that regardless of one’s disposition toward
financial regulation, the mismatch between SROs’
22

See infra, text accompanying notes __.
For other academic discussions of financial self-regulatory
organizations, see Roberta Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. &
FIN. 151 (2008); Saule Omorova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the
Financial Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665 (2010); Saule Omorova, Wall
Street As Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).
23
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governmental powers and private unaccountability is
leading our financial regulatory system towards an
unstable and unsustainable structure at a time when
it most requires strength and stability.
If FINRA, CME, and other financial SROs do wield
greater authority than their members anticipated or
believe lawful, legal challenges may arise under
theories of due process and the Appointments Clause,
as presaged in the Supreme Court’s recent decision
regarding the constitutionality of the newly created
SRO for the accounting industry, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board.24 More problematically,
however, the financial firms that are members of SROs
may begin to withdraw, either in spirit or in fact, from
those
organizations,
depriving
our
regulatory
apparatus of vital expertise in the oversight of complex
financial transactions.25
In Part II of this article, we examine the scope,
rationale, and history of financial self-regulation. In
Part III, we attempt to understand the mechanisms
that are driving the increasing governmentalization of
SROs. In Part IV, we consider the implications of these
changes upon our financial regulatory system. In Part
V, we consider alternatives to the quasi-governmental
outcome by considering other models for cooperation
between industry and regulators, such as through the
use of greater numbers of – and thus increased
competition between – SROs.

24
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010). See also Richard Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund,
Boundary Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of
Government Administration, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Publ. Pol’y 1 (2010); Rao, A
Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB, 79 Ford. L. Rev. 2541 (2011); Nourse & Figura, Toward a
Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2733 (2011).
25
As described infra at ___, trust is an important element of efficient and
low-cost regulation, and self-regulation is thought to be superior to adversarial
government regulation on this score. For a more general treatment on the
importance of trust in social foundations, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1996).
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II. THE SELF-REGULATION OF FINANCE
In this part, we examine the scope, rationale, and
history of financial self-regulation in this country. Our
goal is not to provide a comprehensive historical
account, but rather to focus upon the way in which
self-regulation fits into the overall scheme of financial
regulation, and to observe its significant changes over
time.
A. The Private Character of Law
The promulgation and enforcement of law is, of
course, a core function of government.26 But it is one
shared widely by private actors. Government and
governance are not the same thing, and substantial
regulation of behavior is exercised by nongovernmental regulations or what is commonly known
as private law. If “law” is simply the set of rules that
regulate the actions of a community, then law is made
by families, by firms, by universities, by private clubs,
and countless other non-governmental authorities.
Entities and organizations of all sizes establish and
enforce their own disciplinary codes, often through
their own legislative, executive, and judicial efforts.
Private clubs, for instance, write rules, conduct
investigations, and discipline members with fines or
expulsion after adjudicating cases. Indeed, this
comparatively informal exercise of rulemaking and
enforcement is perhaps the predominant type in our
society.
To be sure, all private law operates atop an
underlying foundation of formal, governmental law.
Thus, should private regulation prove ineffectual or
itself violate broader societal interests embodied in
formal rules, laws, or constitutions, then parties can
appeal to the government.27 This layer of informal
26

See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000).
27
Such review is embedded in current SRO models of regulation. FINRA
is responsible for bringing initial disciplinary actions against brokers, acting
through its Division of Enforcement. FINRA “hearing officers” act as judges.
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ordering atop the formal system explains Douglas’s
shotgun.28 Since government always enjoys the power
to compel, all private law presupposes government
approval or, at the very least, tolerance. A discussion
such as this leads quickly towards the realm of
natural rights and the nature of the state, but we need
not proceed so far. For the purposes of exploring
SROs, we need only acknowledge that as a practical
matter private law can serve as a compliment to or
substitute for direct government regulation. As we will
see in this article, the array of private financial
regulation reflects much of this spectrum, beginning
as it did as a substitute, developing as a vital
compliment, and then seemingly morphing into
government regulation itself.
B. Rationales for Financial Self-Regulation
The logic for the self-regulation of finance is
based in some part on the rational self-interest of
market participants. Industry professionals have
strong incentives to police their own, since many of the
costs of misbehavior are born by all members of the
profession, while the benefits inure only to the
misbehaving few. So long as the few do not control the
regulatory process, self-regulation could in theory
work as well or better than external regulation.
To illustrate the concept, imagine there are two
types of brokers: “good” brokers and “bad” brokers.
Further, assume customers cannot readily distinguish
between the two before choosing a broker. This
supposition is reasonable inasmuch as brokers purvey
an intangible service, making it difficult to distinguish
good from bad through mere inspection. In the
Decisions of hearing panels may be appealed to a 14-member “court” — the
National Adjudicatory Council (NAC) — which comprises seven industry
representatives (elected by members) and seven non-industry members
(appointed by FINRA). (Disclosure: Professor Henderson is currently a nonindustry member of the NAC.) Decisions of the NAC may be appealed to the
SEC, and from there to the circuit courts of appeals and ultimately the US
Supreme Court.
28
See supra note 1.
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absence of an ability to discriminate, rational
customers should discount the amount they will pay
for brokerage services because of the possibility of
choosing a bad broker and thereby being cheated.
For instance, consider customers who would pay
$10 for the services of a good broker, knowing they will
not be cheated, but only $5 for the advice of a bad
broker, who might cheat them. If customers cannot
distinguish between the two types of brokers, they
should only pay $7.50 for the advice of an average
broker, assuming they think there are an equal
number of good and bad brokers. If good brokers
cannot credibly signal their quality, they will be unable
to charge the full value of their services, and therefore
good brokers are likely to exit the market, to reduce
the quality of their service, or to cheat. As such, the
overall quality of brokers is inclined to drop. In this
hypothetical, good brokers are effectively subsidizing
bad brokers. Good brokers therefore possess strong
incentives to identify bad brokers or to remove them
from the industry, since doing so will allow good
brokers to charge more for their services. (Assuming,
of course, that the all-in costs of this oversight are
fewer than lost profits.) Industry self-regulation is an
organic part of a successful brokerage industry, and
government is not obviously necessary to deliver it.
The logic of self-regulation does not apply in
every regulatory situation. In some other industries,
self-regulation may not be very effective. Consider, for
instance, environmental pollution. Pollution may be
profit maximizing for firms in the absence of regulation
because costs (such as damage to the air, vegetation,
or water) are imposed on others. If no mechanism
exists to force an Illinois factory to pay for damage its
emissions do to apple trees in upstate New York, the
Illinois factory is likely to emit more than the socially
optimal level.29 The farmers, their customers, or
29
See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW &
ECON. 1 (1960).
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taxpayers will in turn pay for some of the benefits that
inure to factory’s customers. Only when costs are
internalized to the production function, and therefore
priced by the market, are production and consumption
likely to be optimized.
Brokerage and other financial activity is
amenable to self-regulation because the harm caused
by bad brokers (that is, ones taking too little care or
engaging in too much deleterious activity) is primarily
born by the individuals who are in a contractual
relationship with the broker. When the broker cheats,
the customer loses.30 In contrast, when a factory
pollutes, its customers gain. This reversed outcome
occurs because the costs of the factory’s products are
lower than they would otherwise be, since some of
those costs of production are born by others. Polluters
therefore do not have strong incentives to police other
polluters, and thus self-regulation may be less effective
in contexts such as environmental regulation.31
Yet empowering “good” brokers to police “bad”
brokers risks giving those good brokers the ability to
reduce competition and to raise their own profits. For
example, there is the possibility that relatively larger or
more
well-established
firms
might
exert
disproportionate influence on the SRO, and
manipulate the organization into imposing costs on
relatively smaller or less established firms. In such a
way, self-regulation might also give rise to anticompetitive behavior.
As an example, suppose that compliance with
rules carries both a fixed and a variable cost. A simple
way to appreciate this dynamic is to imagine that the
30
To be sure, there may be some risk, called systemic risk, that
customers’ losses will harm other customers, but for most brokerage deals, this
harm, what we might call “financial pollution,” is slight.
31
There may still be some work for non-governmental regulation, such as
through third-party attestation about compliance or voluntary environmental
controls designed to increase firm or industry reputation. The briefly lived
Chicago Climate Exchange, where firms voluntarily agreed to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, is an example of this. See, e.g., Nathanial Gronewold,
Chicago Climate Exchange Closes Nation’s First Cap-and-Trade System but
Keeps Eye to the Future, NY TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011.
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only cost of compliance is personnel in a compliance
department. If we make the modest assumption that
the number of compliance officers does not scale
directly with the assets under a particular firm’s
management, then smaller firms will find themselves
at a competitive disadvantage, all else being equal, due
to their greater compliance costs. Consider two firms:
one with $100 in assets under management and one
with $1000 in assets under management. If each
officer can oversee $250 in assets, but there is a
minimum of at least one compliance officer, then the
regulatory costs for the smaller firm are one, while
those costs for the larger firm are four. On a per asset
basis, the regulatory costs are lower for the larger firm.
Smaller firms in this kind of system must
substantially outperform larger firms in order to
maintain competitive parity. In this example, the
smaller firm must outperform the larger by 60 basis
points.32
This handicap in scale is a significant problem
only if larger firms dominate the regulatory process,
either through the making or the enforcing of rules.33
Such discrepancies may, of course, be inevitable.
SROs are generally funded by fees levied upon their
members, and these fees are often disproportionately
borne by larger firms.34 In addition, the U.S.
32
To illustrate, consider a 10% return before compliance costs. This rate
returns $110 to the smaller firm and $1100 for the larger firm. Subtracting the
compliance costs yields a net return of $109 for the smaller firm and $1096 for
the larger firm. These dollar amounts translate to a return of 9% for the smaller
firm and 9.6% for the larger firm.
33
Importantly, this is true regardless of whether the regulator is the
government or an SRO. The public choice literature abounds with evidence of
regulatory capture by large, concentrated interests. For some recent evidence of
this in the regulation of broker-dealers by the SEC, see Stavros Gadinis, “The
SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against BrokerDealers,” 67 BUS. LAWYER 679 (2012) (finding larger firms fared better in
enforcement actions (e.g., fewer individuals charged, more use of administrative
sanctions instead of court proceedings, and lower sanctions) compared with
similarly situated smaller firms).
34
See, e.g., Melanie Waddell, FINRA to Hike BD Fees in Effort to
Recoup “Significant Loss,” available at http://www.advisorone.com/
2012/04/27/finra-to-hike-bd-fees-in-effort-to-recoup-signific (describing the
current fee structure, ranging from membership to trading activity, and noting
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population of financial firms comprises relatively few
large firms amongst thousands of smaller firms.35
Thus, the large firms enjoy low coordination costs and
highly aligned interests. Moreover, the political
influence of larger firms, be it with the SRO, the SRO’s
governmental overseer, or Congress, is likely to be
much greater.
In some instances, efforts have been made to
minimize this problem. For instance, after several
scandals, the SEC required FINRA to include more
members of the public on its board of directors.36
Similarly, the quasi-judicial body that hears appeals
from FINRA disciplinary and membership matters
(known as the FINRA National Adjudicatory Council)
also comprises an equal number of industry insiders
(seven) and outsiders (seven).37 Whether these
governance mechanisms constrain large firms from
dominating the rule making process is unclear.
Self-regulation is easily justified if it protects
investors and maximizes social welfare, but may not
be if it is used merely to transfer wealth from investors
to brokers. This “cartelization” problem is present in
almost every area of broker-dealer regulation. Thus,
most of the regulatory debates concerning selfregulation feature contention over which of these two
forces – the efficiency of self-regulation versus the risk
of cartelization – is more prominent or likely in a
particular situation. The problem observers have in
evaluating the efficacy and legitimacy of self-regulation
is that the steps to create and enforce a cartel are hard
to distinguish from steps necessary to help investors
through the policing of bad brokers.
recent FINRA fee increases).
35
FINRA has approximately 4300 members, the overwhelming majority
of which are smaller firms. See http://www.finra.org/ (“FINRA is the largest
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.
We oversee nearly 4,345 brokerage firms, 163,410 branch offices and 635,140
registered securities representatives. Our chief role is to protect investors by
maintaining the fairness of the U.S. capital markets.”).
36
See infra __.
37
See http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/NAC/
naccommittee/.
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Whatever the theoretical limitations upon
financial self-regulation, no other arena of vital
economic activity in this country has regulated itself
for so long or so comprehensively. To those who believe
that effective regulation is possible only when imposed
externally or governmentally, the regulation of
financial
brokers
stands
as
a
powerful
counterexample.38 Next, we provide a sketch of the
history of broker regulation, paying particular
attention to how the relationship between government
and private regulators has changed over time.
C. Evolving from SRO to QGO: The Case of FINRA
An account of the regulation of stockbrokers in
the United States illustrates the phenomenon of
governmentalization that we are attempting to explain
in this article. Although a history of financial SROs is
far beyond the scope of this article,39 a brief sketch of
the major inflection points of regulation demonstrates
how the self-regulatory nature of financial SROs has
grown increasingly governmental. This particular SRO
is becoming, or some have argued has become, a
quasi-governmental organization (QGO).
Professor Roberta Karmel described the
evolution of the SRO for Wall Street professionals this
way: “From 1934 until the present, Congress and the
SEC have struggled to convert SROs from ‘private
clubs’ to public bodies, frequently exploiting scandals
to impose governance reforms on exchanges and the
38

In the case of financial regulation, government and private regulation
are imperfect substitutes for one another. Where one is powerful or effective,
there less need for the other. In this sense, brokerage is more akin to the sale of
typical products, where any harm caused by defects is born primarily by the
consumer of the product. Note, however, that products liability is not an area in
which we see powerful self-regulation. Although there is widespread third-party
attestation – for example, the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval or
Consumers Reports – the law of products liability contains no real selfregulatory component.
39
For more complete treatments, see Arthur Laby, Reforming the
Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 Bus. Law. 395
(2010); James Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the
Securities Laws, 100 Cal. L. Rev. 115 (2012).
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NASD.”40 In a recent speech, SEC Commissioner
Daniel M. Gallagher asked “[i]s FINRA becoming a
‘deputy SEC’?”41
A brief history of stockbroker regulation may be
divided
into
five
major
periods,
spanning
approximately two centuries, from the earliest trading
on Wall Street in the late 18th century until today.
Those periods are roughly as follows: (1) the Pre-New
Deal period (1780s to 1930s); (2) the New Deal and
Post-New Deal period (1930s to 1963); (3) the Reform
period (1963 to 1996); (4) the 21A Report period (1996
to 2007); and (5) the FINRA period (2007 to present).
At each inflection point, one or more of the
mechanisms we describe below appears to cause the
SROs to change in fundamental ways.
Pre-New Deal period. Regulation of stockbrokers
in the United States arose originally not from
government but from the brokers themselves. The first
rules emerged through a private “club” of
“stockjobbers” attempting primarily to increase their
value via membership and private rules and
discipline.42 (In fact, as late as the 1930s,
commentators referred to the stock markets as “a
private club [with] elements of a casino.”43) Beginning
with the first centralized trading in Lower Manhattan
in the late 1700s, brokers policed themselves in an
effort to build trust with clients and to eliminate bad
actors from the profession. As the SEC Historical
Society’s history of self-regulation describes it, the first
SROs provided “a refuge for securities traders
vulnerable to the popular suspicion of their

40

Roberta Karmel, “Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?,” 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. &
FIN. 151 (2008).
41
Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, Market 2012: Time for a Fresh
Look at Equity Market Structure and Self-Regulation, Speech to SIFMA’s 15th
Annual Market Structure Conference, Oct. 4, 2012.
42
For a general discussion, see BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 10 at 171-75.
43
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note __ at 73.
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profession.”44 From the late 1780s until 1938, these
private membership rules were the primary means by
which brokers were regulated.45
The self-regulation of stockbrokers began not so
much to fill a regulatory void but rather to forestall
regulation. In 1792, the New York state legislature
made contracts for the sale of stock owned by others
unenforceable in New York courts.46 Accordingly, the
only way that the growing stock brokerage industry in
New York could continue to grow and flourish was by
creating its own parallel legal system that could,
through private rules, enforce such bargains. This
early form of private enforcement built primarily on
efforts at cartelization by brokers.
Just prior to the enactment of the New York
stockjobbing act, the industry engaged in nascent
efforts at forming a self-regulatory.47 Finally in 1817, a
44
“The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the
Securities Industry, 1792-2010,” available at http://www.sechistorical.org
/museum/galleries/sro/sro02a.php.
45
There was, then as now, some state law overlay policing fraud and
other abuses by brokers. So-called “blue sky” laws—as in trying to prevent
brokers from selling investors “the clear blue sky”—originated in Kansas in
1911, and were adopted by almost every state thereafter. See THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 8.1 (4th ed. 2001). Although
states retain significant authority to license and regulate broker dealers, the the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) preempted
various securities regulations of brokers. See NSMIA, Pub. L. No 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (1996). Specifically, section 15(h) of the Securities Exchange Act
now preempts state-based rules on various financial responsibility metrics (such
as capital and margin requirements) and reporting requirements. See id, section
15(h).
46
See NY Laws, 40th Sess., c. 275, §§ 11, 20 (April 15, 1817) (continuing
in force statute passed in 1792). For a discussion of the laws, see BANNER,
ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 10 at 171-75.
47
A few months earlier, the earliest-known effort was published on a
broadside, which called for “a meeting of the dealers in the public funds in the
city of New-York held at the Coffee-House.” See Werner & Smith, Wall Street,
190-91. At this meeting, a group of dealers in government debt, the first type of
publicly traded securities in the United States, agreed to be bound by fourteen
rules, including a prohibition against dealing with non-participating brokers and
a limitation upon the number of securities that could be sold in a given day. See
Banner at 250-51. This early attempt at cartelization failed after a crash in the
public debt markets in 1792. Several other attempts to build an exclusive
exchange followed. In May 1792, twenty-four brokers agreed to fix
commissions (at one quarter of one percent). Known as the “Buttonwood
Agreement,” popular mythology holds that this agreement was signed under a
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group of nearly 30 brokers formed the New York Stock
and Exchange Board.48 The Board grew and changed
as the market for securities increased over the next
few decades. The average daily trading volume
increased more than fifty fold during this period, as
the number of securities listed grew from about
twenty-five to more than one hundred.49 In response,
the Board increased the formality of its membership
processes and the rules by which it conducted its
business. But the Board never acquired a majority of
the stock trades on Wall Street, with about three times
as many trades taking place “in broker’s offices, in
coffee houses, and in the street.”50 In addition, rival
brokerage associations, such as ones for mining stocks
created in late 1850s, and rival exchanges, such as
ones created in the mid-1830s and mid-to-late 1840s,
rose and collapsed.51 By 1860, the Board “dominated
securities trading in New York,” in part because its
reputation allowed it to determine the prices at which
other trades would happen most effectively.52
The Board created this reputation in part
through its creation of a “miniature legal system” that
included rules governing trading and disputes among
brokers.53 As noted above, for the entire first half of
the nineteenth century, so-called time contracts,
which included most broker transactions, were
Buttonwood tree and that it grew into the New York Stock Exchange. Both are
untrue, and the agreement proved equally untenable. See Peter Eisenstadt, “How
the Buttonwood Tree Grew: The Making of a New York Stock Exchange
Legend,” 19 Prospects: An Annual of American Cultural Studies 75 (1994). A
third agreement by brokers tried to create an exclusive club, with membership
interests, for the trading of securities. Known as the Tontine Coffee-House, its
members included John Jacob Astor and Brockholst Livingston. Banner at 25253 This trading group had rivals, and no single group of brokers was able to
dominate trading during the first part of the 19th Century.
48
BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note10 at
253.
49
Id at 255.
50
Id at 256.
51
See generally ROBERT SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS: THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 17-18 (1970).
52
BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note10 at
257.
53
Id. at 271.
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unenforceable in New York. Accordingly, purely private
law was the only mechanism for guaranteeing the
performance of such contracts. A majority vote of the
Board’s members originally determined the outcome of
disputes: “All questions of dispute in the purchase or
sale of Stocks” were “decided by a majority of the
Board.”54 As the membership grew and the number of
disputes accumulated, subsets of the Board took on
this quasi-judicial role and the decisions in individual
cases took on the nature of precedent.55 This extragovernmental regulation increased public confidence
in brokers associated with the Board, and thereby
attracted business.56
New York’s highest court explicitly blessed the
non-governmental character of the early SROs in
Belton v. Hatch, decided in 1888.57 In Belton, a broker
who was suspended from the Exchange for unsound
practices sued to recover the value of its seat, which
was sold by the Exchange to another broker.58
Denying the claim for recovery of the sum, the court
enforced the contract between the plaintiff and the
Exchange, holding that the Exchange could use the
privilege of membership as a regulatory tool. The court
concluded that “there is nothing against public policy
[in this conclusion], for the reason that whatever a
member acquires is subject to the self-imposed
condition that his title and the rights which accrue
from his membership are regulated by and dependent
upon the laws adopted by [the Exchange], and
expressly consented to by him when he joined.”59
Notably, however, the self-regulation of the
exchanges did not cover the vast majority of stock
transactions, which happened in so-called “over-the54

1817 Const. art. 17.
BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note10 at
272, 274.
56
Id. at 261.
57
Belton v. Hatch, 17 N.E. 225 (N.Y. 1888).
58
Id. at 595.
59
Id. at 596-97.
55
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counter” transactions.60 These transactions would find
no real regulatory oversight until the late 1930s.
New Deal period. This self-regulatory scheme did
not survive as the primary, if not sole, source of
oversight of stock transactions following the stock
market crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic
depression. Although contentious in light of more
recent research,61 at the time the conventional wisdom
of the cause of the crash and the depression was
“unregulated speculation in securities.”62 Accordingly,
the Roosevelt administration drew up legislation that
would largely displace the private regulators, by,
among other things, requiring that government
employees (specifically the Federal Trade Commission,
in its guise as precursor to the SEC) approve all
exchange rules and regulations.63 According to the
Seligman history of the SEC, this proposal was
“tantamount to a declaration of war” on Wall Street,64
and led to an intense lobbying campaign by brokers to
kill the bill.65 The “happy compromise” reached in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the creation of an
SEC with the power to write and enforce new rules,
but with the preexisting regulatory apparatus largely
in place.66
Self-regulation also expanded in this period.
During the early days of the SEC, Chairman James
Landis proposed using self-regulation as a way of
efficiently regulating the nearly 6000 unregulated
securities dealers in the over-the-counter market.
Landis proposed the SEC “help in the organization of a
self-disciplinary agency of dealers . . . [j]ust as the
disciplinary committees of the exchanges have been
60

SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 141.
See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1971).
62
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 76
(quoting Franklin Roosevelt).
63
Id. at 85.
64
Id. at 86
65
Id. at 88-96.
66
Id. at 100
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invaluable to us in our efforts to supervise the
activities on the exchanges.”67 The problem of direct
regulation in the absence of a private supplement was
“a little bit trying to build a structure out of dry
sand.”68
To create the “cohesive force” that would bind
the sand together, Congress amended the Securities
Exchange Act with the Maloney Act of 1938. The
Maloney Act authorized the creation of one or more
SROs for the over-the-counter market. The regulatory
conceit was to use a private body’s “ample contractual
powers over members to take a hand in enforcing the
law.”69 Chairman Douglas defended the Maloney Act to
the Harford Bond Club this way:
By and large, government can operate
satisfactorily only by proscription. That
leaves untouched large areas of conduct
and activity; some of it susceptible of
government regulation but in fact too
minute for satisfactory control; some of it
lying beyond the periphery of the law in
the realm of ethics and morality. Into
these large areas of self-government, and
self-government alone, can effectively
reach.70
Fourteen months after passage of the Act, the SEC
approved the registration request of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the one and
only SRO for the over-the-counter market ever
approved. By offering NASD members a discount on
stock trades executed with other members, the NASD
soon counted more than eighty percent of securities

67

Id. at 142.
Id. at 185.
69
Id. at 186.
70
Id. at 186.
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dealers as members.71 Regulators initially wanted to
require membership, but could not do so until
scandals in 1983 made that goal more politically
tenable.
Over the next twenty or so years, some serious
failures of self-regulation appeared. Perhaps the most
prominent example involved the American Stock
Exchange (formerly the rival to the NYSE known as the
“Curb Exchange, as in stocks sold outside the
exchange floor on the curb) and brokers Elliot and
Company and Gilligan, Will. The SEC ultimately
uncovered
rampant
failures,
including
the
manipulation of securities prices, illegal touting,
bribery, illegal use of inside information, and
publication of misleading prospectuses.72 The problem
was not merely a few bad apples but amounted to “a
general deficiency of standards and a fundamental
failure of controls.”73 The director of the SEC’s Division
of Trading and Exchanges called it a “breakdown” of
the self-regulation of the Exchange.74
Reform Period. William Cary, President Kennedy’s
choice as the new chair of the SEC, immediately seized
upon these failures to conduct a “special study” of the
“adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules
of the national securities exchanges and national
securities associations.”75 The Special Study did not
completely shake the “continued belief in selfregulation as an ingredient in the protection of the
investor,” but it did conclude that “industry selfregulation consistently had been self-interested and
self-protective, often failing to produce standards of
conduct superior to those that existed before the
enactment of the securities laws.”76 The study
recommended enhanced government oversight in areas
71

Id at 188.
Id at 285-86.
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Id at 288.
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Id at 288.
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Id at 295.
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Id at 299.
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ranging
from
suitability
rules
to
licensing
77
requirements for new brokers.
Although the bulk of the Securities Act
Amendments of 1964 flowing from the Special Study
focused on enhanced disclosure by firms and a
breakdown between the categories of listed and
unlisted securities, they did enhance the ability of
NASD to deny membership for unqualified brokers.
(Another proposed provision to require NASD
membership was not adopted by Congress.)
Specifically, sections 15 and 15A required the NASD to
ensure all brokers and associated persons meet
“specified and appropriate standards with respect to
training, experience, and such other qualifications” as
necessary to protect investors.78
The SEC was, however, unable to achieve several
proposed objectives, such as the ban on floor trading
or an increase of the public role in governance of the
exchanges and the other SROs.79 As with earlier
attempts at regulation, these would have to wait for
additional crises to make them possible.
The “back-office crisis” of 1967-70 was one such
event. The crisis, notably similar to a paperwork
problem in the most recent financial crisis, was about
lax back office documentation of trades. Over the
period 1964 to 1968, average daily volume on the
NYSE grew by 265 percent. Reflecting “an
industrywide loss of control of record-keeping
procedures,” the number of complaints against
brokers rose from about 4000 in 1968 to over 12,000
just one year later.80 According to Seligman’s history of
Wall Street, this amounted to “the most serious failure

77
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Hugh F. Owens, “The Securities Act Amendments of 1964,” Speech by
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of securities self-regulation in the [SEC]’s history.”81
The government’s study of the problem concluded that
“the industry concentrated its resources on sales, and
paid insufficient attention to properly handling and
processing the business brought in by its sales
efforts.”82 According to Seligman, “the back-office crisis
had focused attention [in Congress] on the securities
industry, and many members of Congress were openly
hostile to the [NYSE]’s long-advanced arguments about
[self-regulation].”83
In response to the crises of the late 1960s
(including a stock market crash in 1969-70), Congress
increased government control of and the governmental
nature of Wall Street SROs in two ways. The Securities
Investors Protection Act of 1970 created an FDICanalog for customer funds held by brokers. In
addition, Congress gave the SEC the power to require
any SRO to adopt rules or procedures regarding the
inspection of brokers and the licensing requirements
for the industry; to require reporting to regulators of
brokers’ financial condition; and to require inspection
of specific brokers.84
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 were
another watershed change in the nature of broker
SROs. The statute gave the SEC its long-sought-after
power to initiate as well as to approve SRO rules and
81

Id. at 450.
See SEC, Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers
(“SEC Study”), H.R. Doc. No. 92-231 (1971).
83
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 478-79.
It is worth noting that this failure was not something that was obviously
avoidable in a world of direct regulation by the SEC, a point we will return to
below. It is also worth noting there were numerous reported successes of selfregulation over the period. One incident involved the NYSE’s response to the
failure of the brokerage firm Ira Haupt & Company. Even critics of selfregulation point out that it “seemed to establish the wisdom of the SEC’s policy
of deferring to the Exchange on oversight of member firms’ operations and
finances.” Seligman, supra note __ at 451. As we discussed below, it is likely
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rulemaking procedures.85 As Professor Karmel
describes it, “the SEC obtained greater authority to
regulate and supervise the NYSE and other exchanges
and the NASD.”86 The statute also “expanded the
SEC’s role in SRO enforcement and discipline, and
allowed the SEC to play an active role in the
structuring of public securities markets.”87 Perhaps
most importantly, the statute altered the governance of
the SRO, by mandating particular compositions of
boards of directors. The Exchange Act thus provided
that the SROs must “assure a fair representation of
its members in the selection of its directors and
administration of its affairs and provide that one or
more directors shall be representative of issuers and
investors and not be associated with a member of the
exchange, broker, or dealer.”88
Just a few years later, Congress further tightened
the regulatory grip of SROs, by requiring that every
broker dealer be registered with an SRO.89 This
requirement had been desired by the New Dealers, but
it took the various crises of the nineteen-fifties, sixties,
and seventiesto make it a reality.
21A Report period. Over the next several years, the
markets underwent tremendous changes. The growth
of the mutual fund industry, the end of fixed
commissions on the exchanges, the birth and growth
of the OTC markets, known as NASDAQ, and the
growth of so-called “day traders” brought tremendous
85
See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179. See S. Rep. No. 94-75 (1975).
86
Karmel, “Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be
Considered Government Agencies?,” 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008).
87
Id at 160.
88
Pub. L. No. 94–29, June 4, 1975, 89 Stat 97, 15 USC § 78(f).
89
Pub.L. No. 98-38, §3, 97 Stat. 205-07 (amending §§ 15(b)(8), (9) of the
Securities Exchange Act, Exchange Act § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. §§78o-4(b)(8), (9)
(1988)) (“It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to effect any
transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any
security . . . unless such broker or dealer is registered . . . .”); See also, Koebel,
James T. (2010) "Trust and the Investment Adviser Industry: Congress' Failure
to Realize FINRA's Potential to Restore Investor Confidence," Seton Hall
Legislative Journal: Vol. 35: Iss. 1, Article 3.at 10.
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regulatory pressure upon SROs and the SEC. More
and more Americans became involved in the stock
market, and increasingly they were using brokers’
services.
Under the chairmanship of Arthur Levitt, the SEC
began to increase its enforcement efforts on top of SRO
efforts.90 In 1996, for instance, the SEC, NASD, and
NYSE conducted a “sweep” of over 100 small and
medium-sized brokers, finding that many were
engaging in substandard hiring and monitoring
practices.91 In addition, the Department of Justice
increased prosecutions, convicting 17 “rogue brokers”
in ten states in 1997 alone.92
But the most significant regulatory development
involved a fundamental remake of broker SROs. The
change started with a NASD committee led by former
Senator Warren Rudman, which concluded that
“[f]undamental change is required” to “NASD’s
governance structure” as a result of growth in markets
and expansion of NASD’s dual role as regulator and
owner of NASDAQ.93
Following shortly upon the Rudman report, a
study by professors William Christie and Paul Schultz
entitled “Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid OddEighths Quotes?” concluded that there was “an
implicit agreement among market makers to avoid
using odd-eighths” in order to increase their profits.94
This study prompted a 1994 investigation by the DOJ
90
Statement by Chairman Arthur Levitt U.S. Securities Exchange
Conference Regarding the NASD Washington, DC (Aug 8, 1996)
91
See NASD Regulatory & Compliance Alert, “NASD Joins SEC,
Others, In National Regulatory Sweep,” Apr. 1996, available at
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1990/1996
_0401_NASD_RCA.pdf.
92
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 645.
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September 19, 1995 Executive Summary of the Report of the NASD
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Board
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Governors,
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and a landmark study by the SEC, known as the
“21(a) Report,” after the provision authorizing the
study.95 The administrative proceeding following the
report concluded that “NASD was aware of information
suggesting that its members were engaged in
misconduct which had potential anticompetitive
implications and could be detrimental to the interests
of investors,” and yet took no regulatory action against
them.96 The SEC censured the NASD, fined it, and
required it to “enhance its systems for market
surveillance.”97 In the wake of the report, the SEC
required NASD to make fundamental changes to
governance, membership and licensing rules, its
investigation and enforcement policies, and to its
procedural code.98 For instance, prior to the 21(a)
Report, in disciplinary matters members sat as quasigrand juries to decide whether to bring an enforcement
case against individuals or firms. This arrangement
was a prototypical example of self-regulation. But after
the failure to enforce cartel behavior in bid-ask
spreads, the SEC required that enforcement actions be
made via a centralized department, in the Washington,
DC headquarters of NASD. The SEC also “insisted on
new management at NASD,” and it handpicked Frank
Zarb, a friend of Chairman Levitt’s for the job.99
FINRA period. After the bursting of the dot-com
bubble, the accounting scandals, and the series of
corporate collapses in the early 2000s, another
important change came to broker SROs. In 2007, the
SEC approved the merger of the NASD (the
95
“Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market,” available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nd21a-report.txt.
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enforcement arm of the pre-NASDAQ NASD) and the
enforcement arm of the NYSE into a single industry
SRO known as FINRA. Efficiency was the official
justification for the merger.100 The idea was to
“increase efficient, effective, and consistent regulation
of securities firms, provide cost savings to securities
firms of all sizes, and strengthen investor protection
and market integrity.” According to NASD, additional
benefits were to “streamline the broker-dealer
regulatory system, combine technologies, and permit
the establishment of a single set of rules and a single
set of examiners with complementary areas of
expertise within a single SRO.” The SEC Chairman,
Christopher Cox, noted that the SEC “will work closely
with FINRA to eliminate unnecessarily duplicative
regulation, including consolidating and strengthening
what until now have been two different member
rulebooks and two different enforcement systems.”101
The creation of FINRA created a monopoly for
broker SROs, with both the upside and downside
effects. As discussed below, this change made SEC
control perhaps more likely and the interaction
between the SEC and the SRO closer. As a condition of
the merger, the SEC required that FINRA’s by-laws
increase public representation on the board, such that
now 11 of the 23 seats are for Public Board members.
In addition, the interaction between FINRA and the
SEC has increased, perhaps most notably through the
recent appointment of former FINRA chief executive
officer Mary Schapiro as Chair of the SEC.
***
The FINRA story is one of dramatic transition from
self-regulation to quasi-governmental regulation.
100

See, e.g., “Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the ByLaws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related Changes to
Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of
NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc.,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
2007-07-26.
101
See, e.g., “SEC Gives Regulatory Approval for NASD and NYSE
Consolidation, "U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2007-07-26.

28

BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH
Although the transition is not complete, and federal
courts have not conclusively deemed FINRA to be a
purely governmental actor, the increasing departure
from self-regulation is unmistakable.102 Whether SROs
become fully governmental is a matter for their
members, legislatures, and regulators to determine in
the years ahead. That they have grown increasingly
governmental in the years past is clear. We next
attempt to describe the mechanisms that are driving
this transformation.
III. MECHANISMS OF GOVERNMENTALIZATION
In this part, we identify the mechanisms that
may influence the character and behavior of selfregulatory organizations. Our thesis is that several of
these factors are increasingly leading SROs to
resemble the governmental agencies that oversee their
activities, to the extent that SRO might more
accurately
be
dubbed
quasi-governmental
organizations. Over the past few decades, some
financial SROs appear to have lost much of the “self”
in self-regulatory organization, and that element of
independence has been replaced with a more
governmental approach. We call the process by which
this is happening the “governmentalization” of SROs.
By “governmentalization,” we mean a process through
which ostensibly private activities or organizations
acquire the characteristics, functions, or appearance
of government.103 While any regulatory body, be it an
SRO or a private club (such as a golf club or a
university), that administers rules of conduct
necessarily engages in governance, we contemplate a
more formal invocation of the powers and punishment
of a sovereign. Along the spectrum of governance, one
pole may be thought of as purely governmental action
102
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(such as formal charges brought by federal
prosecutors) while the other is purely private (such as
the informal rules of decorum encouraged at a family
dinner table). Much of the operations of financial SROs
lie somewhere between these extremities, but it is our
contention that the nature of those activities is
evolving more toward the governmental direction.
Government action, for these purposes, exhibits
several key characteristics that differentiate it from
non-government action. As a matter of practice, the
federal government takes action through a highly
formal bureaucracy subject to compendious legislation
governing civil service rules and protections. As the
quotations from William O. Douglas and others above
suggest, government action is also more blunt, being
less capable of the enforcement of ethical and moral
judgments due to the external, third-party nature of
the enforcement.
Government action is also uniquely powerful
because it acts, at its fundament, based upon its
monopoly on lawful violence and because it is not
beholden to competitive market forces. Because of
these factors, government action has been historically
perceived by many in this country to be more
potentially dangerous or coercive for those subject to
its authority. Accordingly, government action is
concomitantly subject to constitutional, legislative,
and other legal bulwarks. This array of protections
from the awesome power of the state establishes a set
of presumptions that are held, to a greater or lesser
extent by the public, depending on their own prior
beliefs, the regulatory circumstances, and other
relevant facts. Broadly, though, individuals in the
United States are likely to view many governmental
regulatory processes as more adversarial and
potentially consequential than private or nongovernmental process, notwithstanding the panoply of
constitutional protections.
Governmentalization is the process by which
non-governmental actors acquire more government30
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like characteristics; that is, the way in which they
become more rule-bound, more adversarial, more
bureaucratic, and, most importantly, more capable of
depriving their subjects of life, liberty, or happiness.
Our examination of governmentalization focuses
primarily upon the lessons that can be drawn from the
experience of FINRA as the securities industry’s most
prominent self-regulator. These lessons demonstrate
forces that may, in some combination, be driving what
we perceive to be a move from self-regulation to quasigovernmental regulation, and perhaps eventually to
outright governmental regulation. We consider several
potential forces in turn, while recognizing that they
might act in isolation or any variety of temporal or
circumstantial combinations. In short, we do not
purport to unveil a mechanical formula that produces
governmentalization but rather attempt to explore the
variety of contexts that may do so.
A. Possible Mechanisms of Governmentalization
1. The Nature of Financial Victims
The first potential driver of a change in the
nature of self-regulation is the type of individuals or
institutions being regulated. We should expect the
locus and intensity of regulation to correspond in some
degree to the characteristics of potential victims of
wrongdoing. If potential victims are notably weak and
vulnerable, we should expect to see one set of
regulatory actors and choices; while if potential victims
are comparatively strong and able to fend for
themselves, we should expect to find another.
Government has a greater interest in protecting the
weak and vulnerable, so we would expect this interest
to be correlated with more direct control of regulation
by government officials.
Similarly, if potential victims are not central
actors within the industry being regulated, then they
are less likely to be able to participate in any selfregulatory system, so we should expect greater
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governmental involvement and greater regulatory
intensity. Self-regulation is likely to be more effective
where the interests of those who govern and those who
are governed are closely aligned. In addition, if the
potential victims and wrongdoers are easy to categorize
ex ante, then government regulation is more likely. If
two participants cannot tell whether they will be on
the wrong side of a particular transaction, then the
case for non-governmental regulation is stronger, since
reputational forces and a balanced approach is more
likely to arise naturally.
These predictions are consistent with the
observed pattern of the allocation of private and public
law. We should not be surprised to see purely private
law governing disputes between different merchants in
an industry. Lisa Bernstein’s work describing the
almost completely autonomous self-regulation of the
cotton and diamond industries demonstrates many of
these characteristics: they are situations in which the
potential victims are sophisticated, repeat players, and
difficult to characterize ex ante.104 At the other end of
the private-public law enforcement spectrum are
traditionally government-only subjects, such as
prohibitions on the use of violence or in areas like
products liability or environmental law. Securities
regulation, we believe, is a milieu that falls somewhere
between these extremes, though it was not always
such. And, it is our contention in this article, that it
will not always remain so.
The federal securities laws impose significant
restrictions on every aspect of the process by which
companies seek to raise money from investors.105
Rules mandate extensive disclosures, govern the
timing and nature of all issuer communications,
restrict who can buy and how much they can buy, and
104

See, e.g., Lisa M. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MICH. LAW REV. 1724 (2001).
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See, e.g., The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. For a
general overview, see http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml.
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impose strict liability for material misstatements or
omissions by issuers.106 The regulatory burden is
enormous. But broad exceptions exist in cases
involving investors who are wealthy or financially
sophisticated.107 The border of the SEC’s jurisdiction is
based on a determination of whether or not the
potential victims in question need the protection of the
securities laws or, if instead, they can “fend for
themselves.”108 In broad terms, the securities
regulations deem wealthy or sophisticated investors as
able to fend for themselves, but less wealthy or less
sophisticated investors as unable to do so.109
Accordingly the intensity of government regulation is
strong in the latter case and weak in the former case.
If the nature of potential victims is relevant to
the type and locus of regulation, then we would expect
SRO
regulation
to
exhibit
more
private-like
characteristics when the parties are sophisticated,
industry-insiders, or capable of fending for themselves
(such as diamond merchants), and self-regulation to
be more quasi-governmental where the opposite is
true. In short, the SRO model should dominate in
markets with relatively fewer vulnerable victims, and
the QGO model should be prevalent in circumstances
with relatively more vulnerable victims.110
The evolution of FINRA, as we have described it,
is one in which there has been a significant shift in the
governmental nature of its regulatory approach. This
increasing
governmentalization
has
developed
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transactions, as the Financial Crisis teaches.
107

33

BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH
contemporaneously with two significant changes in the
securities industry over the same period. The number
of vulnerable individuals entering the investment
market has increased and the importance of the
broker as intermediary has consequently increased as
well.
First, the number of individuals investing in
securities products has increased dramatically, and
therefore the number of investors who appear to need
the protection of the securities laws has increased as
well.111 The number of brokerage accounts has
increased over 1000 percent since 1980, at a
compound annual growth rate of about 9 percent per
year. Specifically, in 1980, fewer than 10 million
Americans owned individual brokerage accounts; in
2009, approximately 110 million did so. This growth
cannot be explained by population growth, which grew
just 38 percent or about 1 percent per year (or nine
times slower) over the same period. Another way to see
this development is to compare individual investment
accounts as a percentage of the population. If every
investment account were held by a single individual, in
1980 about 4 percent of the country’s population held
such accounts, while in 2009 about 36 percent did.112
Accordingly, the type of investors who may need the
protection of the securities laws—that is, relatively
unsophisticated investors—appears to have increased
as well.
Not only has the number of individual accounts
grown dramatically but the growth correlates well with
the timing of observable changes in the nature of the
self-regulation of securities markets. As noted above
the most substantial changes in the self-regulatory
111
The only way it could be otherwise is if the first entrants into a market
are the less sophisticated. Although we do not have evidence on this point, this
strikes us as extremely unlikely.
112
Population in 1980 was about 227 million and there were about 10
million accounts; in 2009, the population was roughly 300 million and there
were
110
million
accounts.
http://www.census.gov/population/www
/censusdata/hiscendata.html

34

BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH
model occurred during the decade from 1996 to 2006.
In the period leading up to 1996, the number of
individual accounts increased by more than five times,
while it has less than doubled in the period since
then.113
Second, the large and growing investment in
securities by individuals is increasingly intermediated
by brokers. In 1965, “households” directly held about
84 percent of U.S. equities, while "institutions" held
the remaining 16 percent. In 2009, households held
just under 38 percent, while institutions held the
remaining 62 percent.114 This nearly 50-percentage
point increase in the intermediation of the securities
business is associated with the rise of the mutual fund
industry and other forms of collective investing, such
as ETFs and other pooled investment funds. As more
“average” Americans have entered the investment
world, they have done so primarily using regulated
intermediaries. The fact that accounts are more likely
to be held by brokers for the benefit of individual
investors rather than by the individual investors
themselves increases the potential for abuse by
brokers, especially in ways that might implicate the
integrity of a regulatory process dominated by brokers.
The traditional approach to retirement investing
was through the use of “defined benefit” plans in
which a worker is promised a set amount of money in
regular
increments
during
retirement.
This
arrangement admits fewer occasions for cheating by
brokers or other securities professionals, and if it does
occur it does so at the employer level, where
113

This data does not necessarily imply causation. It is plausible that the
change in the regulatory model caused the increase in the growth in the number
individual accounts. But the timing of the growth in accounts does not fit well
with this story about causation. In addition, it seems quite a stretch to believe
that the changes in the self-regulatory model were sufficiently quick and
transparent to the public that they caused a big change in the investment
behavior of individuals. The data do not discount the possibility that there has
been some impact on investment decisions by the regulatory change, say
through a lowering of brokerage fees and the like.
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sophistication and risk bearing are both generally
higher. The more recent approach to retirement
investing, however, is via “defined contribution” plans,
most popularly though 401(k) plans and individual
retirement accounts, in which individual workers set
aside a set amount of their salary in regular
installments, which they can they invest through a
menu of default options (most of which are usually
mutual funds) available in their 401(k) plan or IRA.
Although such plans are governed by ERISA, which
imposes fiduciary duties upon their administrators,
individuals
(rather
than
professional
pension
managers) are responsible for investment decisions
and, accordingly, more vulnerable to financial
intermediaries who may be determined to take
advantage of less-sophisticated customers.
Take, for example, the recent case of Epstein v.
SEC.115 The defendant-broker worked for Merrill Lynch
making mutual fund recommendations to Merrill’s
customers.
He
was
compensated
largely
by
commissions, which he earned when customers
changed their fund allocations or moved assets from
one fund to another. The majority of the broker’s
customers “ranged in age from 71 to 93 years old and
were widowed, retired, and earned low annual
incomes,” and yet he made recommendations that they
incur relatively large transaction fees (and thus
commissions for the broker) by switching mutual
funds, often into funds with higher fees.116 This type of
misconduct is unfortunately likely to be more common
in a world in which average investors, like the elderly
victims in this case, are directly involved in their
investment decisions.
In short, the past several decades have seen a
dramatic increase in the number of individuals
115
116

416 Fed. Appx. 142 (3rd Cir. 2010).

FINRA barred broker from industry for making unsuitable investments. See In the
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directing the investment of their own assets through
the use of a retail intermediary. These factors
understandably prompted regulatory changes, not
surprisingly in a more governmental direction.
2. Size of Potential Losses
The size of potential investor losses is a related
factor that might influence the nature of regulation.
For the class of unsophisticated investors—the kind of
investors described above who have entered the
market recently—the potential for relatively larger
losses may be explain a more formal, government-like
regulatory role. Put simply, the state’s interest as “the
investor’s advocate”117 is greater when potential harm
is greater. Therefore, when performing the cost-benefit
analysis regarding the delegation of regulatory
responsibility to an SRO, the cost side of the equation
increases as potential losses increase. Assuming the
benefits of SRO regulation remain constant, this rise
in costs will occasion a shift on the margin toward the
QGO model or even regulatory usurpation by the
government entirely.118
The only way in which greater potential losses
would support the continued use of the SRO model is
if somehow the benefits of the SRO model, such as
knowledge, information, and lower enforcement costs,
were increasing concurrently with the size of potential
losses. To analyze this, we can apply the simple model
of punishment developed by economist Gary Becker.119
In Becker’s model, deterrence is a product of the
probability of detection and the punishment imposed.
To compare the relative efficacy of SRO versus
governmental regulation along this dimension for a
given harm, one simply estimates these two inputs.
117

See “The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity,
and
Facilitates
Capital
Formation,”
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
118
We discuss the rough tradeoffs in this choice below, noting the latter
may be preferable to the former.

119
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Holding the probability of detection constant,
achieving optimal deterrence depends on the range of
expected sanctions. For larger losses, the size of the
sanctions must increase to achieve greater deterrence.
Since SROs are constrained in their types and severity
of sanctions—criminal sanctions are unavailable and
large fines are rare and subject to recent criticism120 —
Becker’s analysis suggests that increasing losses will
prompt increasing governmentalization.121
Another factor also suggests an increasing
government-like role for regulators in tandem with a
rise in the prevalence of retail investing. As the losses
for individuals increases, the political stability of the
SRO model may prove more fragile. To appreciate this
conjecture, consider a case in which the regulator
enjoys the same success rate at vindicating investor
losses, regardless of the stakes. This parity would
mean that the chance that an investor who feels
cheated is satisfied with the outcome of the regulatory
action is constant over time as the amount at stake
increases. For example, assume the average loss was
$10,000, but that over time it increased to $50,000,
and say 80 percent of victims were satisfied at both
times. Although only 20 percent of victims are
dissatisfied in both cases, in the second period, the
expected loss is $10,000 ($50,000 x 0.20), while in the
earlier period, the expected loss is $2000 ($10,000 x
0.20).122 Insofar as the unsatisfied or uncompensated
victims blame the SRO generally for their lack of
satisfaction, then such dissatisfaction may increase
pressure on the SRO model, since the unsatisfied
regulatory expectations are five times as great. This
discontent might be true, for instance, if victims
120
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The precise contours will, of course, depending on the institutios and individuals
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believe that the SRO in question is merely a club of
insiders designed to protect themselves by forestalling
government regulation. The important point is that
even assuming the number of people who believe this
and the intensity of their beliefs remain constant over
the period, the increased amount of losses increases
the likely impact of regulatory failure, and therefore
increased pressure to move toward a different
regulatory model. Note also that if the belief that the
SRO model is biased in favor of insiders increases with
increases in unsophisticated investment, then the
expansion of the investment business to larger
numbers of individuals (as described above) may lead
to an increase in the number of individuals holding
negative opinions of the SRO or SRO model generally
in the wake of investment losses.
This argument does not prove that all large
losses can be regulated effectively only by
governmental regulators, inasmuch as SROs have a
long tradition of policing very large trades by regulated
parties. It simply points out that for average investors
an increase in the expected amount at stake may
impact the SRO cost-benefit analysis on the margin.
So, while an SRO model may be clearly superior with
average losses of $10,000, when they increase to
$50,000, more deterrence may be necessary, which
might require greater government-like regulation.
Evidence does exist to suggest that the potential
losses for individual investors may be rising. Not only
has the number of individuals investing increased
sharply, but the total amount of money invested in
securities markets has as well. In 1965, the total value
of U.S. equities held by Americans in individual
accounts was $735 billion or about $4,946 billion in
2009 dollars.123 In 2009, the total value of U.S.
equities was $20,451 billion (down from a pre-collapse
high of over $25,577 billion).124 This growth amounts
123
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to more than a 500 percent increase in the value of
accounts held by the public. Investing in securities
has become much more important to Americans over
this time, and so too have the regulatory stakes.
Evidence also exists to suggest that the relative
importance of securities investing has increased as
well. Over the past three decades, households have
shifted more of their liquid assets (that is, assets
excluding real estate and other real property) from
cash
and
government
securities
into
equity
investments. In 1980, cash or cash-like assets125
constituted about 58 percent of total liquid financial
assets; by 2009, they had fallen to only 36 percent.126
Or, looking at the data another way, in 1975, U.S.
households held most of their liquid assets in bank
deposits (51%), but by 2009, they held those liquid
assets overwhelmingly in "securities products"
(73%).127
This reallocation means that more average
investors find themselves in the equities market, and
that the stakes for them of effective regulation are
higher than they were in the past. With personal
financial stakes that much higher, we should not be
surprised to find regulators pursuing an increasingly
stringent – or governmental – role in order, as they see
it, to vindicate investor preferences and to ensure wellfunctioning markets more effectively
3. One-way Ratchet I: The Financial Industry
One justification for reducing the self in SROs
may come from industry participants who respond
rationally to failures of the regulatory system. Failures
appear to trigger a one-way ratchet that increasingly
moves the regulatory system away from control by the
125
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industry toward the direction of government-like
control.
This phenomenon is illustrated by the selfish
rationale for regulation. In a world in which investors
cannot readily distinguish between “good” and “bad”
brokers before choosing one, perversely, good brokers
are worse off and bad brokers better off. But if good
brokers can somehow differentiate themselves in
advance, they can charge more for their services. This
discrimination might be hard to effectuate without a
neutral third party to serve as a credible source of
enforcing regulations that distinguish between the two.
For members of a particular industry, then,
there are powerful incentives to oversee a selfregulatory system that works, even in the absence of
government. Indeed, in the historical developments we
have seen in this country’s financial system, the
eighteenth century witnessed just such a confluence of
incentives for financiers to self-regulate. Such a
system is, of course, highly dependent on the
credibility of its enforcement system. If would-be
customers believe the regulatory threat is not serious,
but rather motivated by other goals (such as protecting
an industry of bad brokers from more serious external
regulation), then the entire premise of self-regulation
will be undermined. In such a case, the value of
regulation is lost, since the good brokers can no longer
credibly distinguish themselves from bad brokers.
Such a negative perception might increase over
time, even if the SRO is very effective at policing the
market and disciplining bad brokers. Assume, for
instance, that a given SRO is ninety-five percent
effective, and, given the costs of regulation, this level of
regulation is an efficient one. Assume further that the
remaining five percent of cases that result in fraud
attract greater publicity and generate more political
outrage than the corresponding positive coverage
generated by the ninety-five percent of cases of
effective regulation. If such an imbalance of coverage
exists, as anecdotal impressions of media reports
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suggest, then customers may believe the level of fraud
is much higher than five percent.
In that case, the rational policy for good brokers
might be to increase the distance between the
regulator and the regulated – that is, to sacrifice some
of the “self” from the self-regulatory model to increase
the credibility of the claim that the regulation is
neutral and constructed to police bad conduct. A
promise to operate subject to government regulation
may be more compelling than one to have the industry
regulate itself. If so, then perceived failures of
regulation (whether or not actual failures) will tend to
increase the governmentalization of an SRO and push
it more toward becoming a QGO.
The history of the securities SRO described
above is consistent with this dynamic. Each regulatory
failure, from the back-office scandal of the late
nineteen-sixties
to
the
price-fixing
scandals
culminating in the 21A Report in the mid-nineteennineties, has led to a change in which the industry
SRO has become more like a government regulator.
The industry might win greater deterrence value
by fully moving to a government regulator, since
presumably the SEC as regulator sends a more
powerful signal about the policing of the industry than
any SRO or even QGO could. But this consideration
must be weighed against the reluctance of Congress to
fund such an expansion and any efficiency savings
from relying upon an SRO in the first place. In other
words, the credibility of the regulator as a neutral
enforcer of rules is just one factor that helps to explain
the scope and nature of the SRO. The point of the oneway ratchet is simply that whatever the equilibrium
position is at a given time in terms of the choice
between government and SRO, the inevitable failures
of an SRO regulator (even if efficient) may have a
rational tendency to push the industry toward favoring
a regulator that looks more like the government.
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4. One-way ratchet II: The Financial Regulator
A similar dynamic may also be at work within
the regulatory agency overseeing any SRO. The
successes and failures of the self-regulatory process
may also accumulate over time in a way that biases
the locus of regulatory authority toward government or
government-like conduct. If SRO successes in
preventing or reducing the costs of misconduct are
relatively less politically salient than SRO failures,
then the SRO will face one-sided pressure to change
its approach to regulation from government overseers.
To illustrate this version of the one-way ratchet,
consider an SRO that has one hundred regulated
activities, and wants to design a regulatory system to
maximize the efficiency of the regulation (that is, to
achieve the highest social welfare at the lowest
regulatory cost). The SRO has two options: Option 1 is
a characteristic SRO approach, imposing a regulatory
cost of $1 per activity, a chance of failure of 20
percent, and a cost of failure of $1000; Option 2 is a
more governmental approach, imposing a regulatory
cost of $3 per activity, a chance of failure of 10
percent, and a cost of failure of $1000. If the SRO were
deciding in a vacuum which regulatory option to use,
it might choose Option 1; the additional cost of using
Option 2 ($200 in additional regulatory costs) are
greater than the expected benefits of reduced failure
from Option 2 ($100 in lower expected losses from
failure). But, if the political bodies overseeing the SRO
fully internalize the expected losses but not the
expected regulatory costs, then the calculation might
be different. Imagine, for example, that the political
costs of a public failure of a regulated entity are three
times the dollar amount at stake, while all other
factors remain the same as in the example above. In
such a case, from the perspective of the political
superiors, the benefits of moving to Option 2 are $300,
while the costs are only $200. The SRO would
therefore face pressure to adopt Option 2, even though
it is the less efficient regulatory approach.
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Several features of the SRO model may make
this one-directional migration likely. SROs do not
enjoy full and independent control of their regulatory
authority but rather now exist as subordinate agents
of the governmental entities that ultimately control
their activities. Congress is the source of all
regulations, though it has specifically created various
administrative
agencies
to
enforce
statutory
commands and to promulgate additional rules for the
regulation of particular industries. The SEC (created in
1934), for instance, is responsible for regulating
“securities” markets, while the CFTC (created in 1974)
is responsible for regulating “commodities” markets.
Each of these agencies, in turn, relies upon various
SROs to perform day-to-day regulatory enactment,
compliance, and enforcement.
FINRA, for example, serves as the primary SRO
for securities brokers and dealers. FINRA writes rules
for brokers and firms, though since 1975 these rules
have been subject to final approval by the SEC, which
is in turn accountable, to a certain extent, to the
federal political branches of Congress and the
president. In addition, FINRA conducts disciplinary
proceedings, which are appealable first to the SEC and
then to the federal courts and, ultimately, to the
Supreme Court. Congress therefore enjoys tremendous
influence over this entire process, since it controls
funding for the various agencies, produces legislation
governing all the parties, and wields subpoena power
to compel adherence to its desires.
The recent failure of commodities broker MF
Global provides a possible example of the one-way
regulatory ratchet. MF Global was a leading
commodities and securities broker, regulated by,
among others, the SRO arm of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME).128 This SRO structure is relied upon
by the CFTC, which is the primary regulator of the
128
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commodities industry and futures merchants such as
MF Global. In essence, the CFTC outsources
regulatory oversight to the exchanges, including CME,
which serve as the markets in which brokers operate.
This delegation relieves the CFTC from having to
examine the brokers directly. But the MF Global
failure has raised criticisms of this arrangement.
MF Global made a large ($6.3 billion) but
disastrously incorrect bet on European sovereign debt
that drove the firm into a hasty bankruptcy. As the
firm approached insolvency, about $1.6 billion in
customer funds disappeared. When facts surfaced
suggesting that this customer money, which CME is
charged with ensuring remains segregated from the
firm’s proprietary funds, was used to try to shore up
the firm’s finances, the incident created a political
firestorm.
Congressional
committees
convened
numerous hearings, the former head of the FBI was
appointed trustee of MF Global, and countless ongoing
lawsuits and investigations were launched.
This incident caused the CFTC to conduct a
wholesale review of the way in which futures brokers,
such as MF Global, are regulated.129 Both Republican
and Democratic commissioners on the CFTC made
public statements suggesting the SRO model failed in
the MF Global case. Bart Chilton, a Democratic
commissioner, said: “I think we’ve gone too far in
allowing the exchanges to be so self-regulatory that it’s
obfuscated the need for the cop to be on the beat all
the time.”130 Similarly, Scott O’Malia, a Republican
commissioner, said: “The MF Global collapse was a
huge broken window in the [CFTC’s] neighborhood . . .
[and] [t]o restore public confidence and deter future
violations . . . [the CFTC] needs to continue taking
action.”131 These comments and the CFTC’s response

129 Christopher Doering, “MF Global Triggers Regulatory Rehink at CFTC,”
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-mfglobalcftc-policy-idUSTRE8102IV20120201/.
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no doubt have been influenced by strong pressure on
Capitol Hill. Leading congressional Republicans and
Democrats have used the incident to call for greater
oversight of regulated entities by the CFTC, as well as
for enhanced procedures by SROs to protect customer
funds. For instance, Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) used
the failure of MF Global to denounce the CFTC in
congressional hearings, demanding an accounting on
behalf of “folks in Kansas . . . [who] have been severely
damaged economically by the actions . . . of MF
Global.”132 In numerous hearings and in countless
news and opinion pieces, the CFTC has been severely
criticized for its failure to ensure MF Global’s
customers were not harmed.
CME, for its part, however, has argued that it
did everything it could reasonably do to prevent the
collapse of MF Global. In economic terms, the CME
argument is that its regulation was efficient, even
though it failed to detect this particular allegation of
fraud. According to the CME, examiners from its SRO
audited MF Global’s accounts in the days before the
firm’s bet on European debt went bad, and found that
the customer fund accounts were “overcollateralized”
by $200 million.133 CME has defended the SRO
approach, arguing that MF Global duped regulators,
and that no amount of reasonable oversight could
have prevented those who wanted to break the rules
from doing so. For instance, CME points to an email it
sent the general counsel of MF Global the day before
several hundred million dollars in customer funds
were illegally moved out of a customer account and
used to pay down a collateral call from a British unit of
JP Morgan. The email commanded that “effectively
immediately, any equity withdrawals must be
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approved in writing by CME.”134 But CME did not
learn of the nearly $200 million moved offshore to JP
Morgan until three days after the transfer.135
Whether the SRO model was to blame or not for
the violation of segregation rules in the MF Global case
seems to be a minor factor relative to the political
pressure the CFTC faces to reform in the wake of the
event. If the CFTC is going to be blamed for the MF
Global failure, it is more likely to try to reform the
regulatory process to exert more direct control.
Furthermore, if successes are not celebrated in a
manner proportional to the way in which failures are
denounced, then the forces will inevitably privilege a
more governmental form of regulation, even if that
approach may not be the most efficient regulatory
approach.
Perception therefore may appear to matter more
than reality in this system. Even if the SRO model is
more efficient, say at reducing risk for a given
expenditure on regulation, if average investors believe
a more governmental approach is better, then
government will have an incentive to make the SRO
look more like government. Markets work in significant
part because of trust and confidence, and therefore the
perception about regulation may be as or more
important than a purely mechanistic cost-benefit
analysis that excludes market perception.
The power of investor beliefs, as channeled
through politicians, acting for both the interests of
their constituents and for themselves, is complicated
by the diffusion of accountability inherent in the SRO
approach. We consider this factor next.
5. Misguided Accountability
The lack of direct accountability on the part of
various political actors who oversee financial SROs
134
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may
also
drive
those
SROs
toward
governmentalization. In short, if regulators such as the
commissioners of administrative agencies like the SEC
and CFTC that oversee SROs, are politically blamed
whether or not they are involved directly in regulating
a failed entity, then they will necessarily prefer a
greater direct role in regulating the entity in question.
There are several reasons why this might be true.
For one, greater control may mean less risk in
the eyes of the ultimate accountable authority. The
presence of agency costs means that the principal
regulator (e.g., the SEC) will be concerned that its
agent (e.g., FINRA) will act in a way that maximizes the
agent’s welfare instead of the principal’s. Therefore,
the principal will take steps to ensure alignment,
including monitoring, incentives, and punishments;
the agent may also take steps to prevent excessive
involvement by the principal, in the form of various
bonding mechanisms. All of these dynamics will
increase as the expected costs of regulatory failure
(crudely, the probability of failure times the costs of
failure) increase. In other words, a greater potential
downside will cause the principal to spend more time
and money monitoring the agent to ensure faithful
agency. Even so, when the ultimate authority for
failure resides with the principal and not the agent,
the locus of decision-making authority will also
eventually shift to the principal as well. The more the
blame falls on the principal, the more control it may
seek to exercise.
This migration is the insight of economist
Kenneth Arrow, who described the tradeoff between
accountability
and
authority,
noting
that
accountability
must be capable of correcting errors but
should not be such as to destroy the
genuine values of authority. Clearly, a
sufficiently strict and continuous organ of
[accountability] can easily amount to a
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denial of authority. If every decision of A is
to be reviewed by B, then all we have
really is a shift in the locus of authority
from A to B and hence no solution to the
original problem.136
Accountability and authority are in tension, and the
more one party bears the costs of failure, the more
that party will assert its authority.
The MF Global story told above may provide
support for the existence of this factor as well. MF
Global was overseen by numerous regulators in the
various different parts of its business, none of which
was responsible for the firm’s entire business.137 But
when MF Global declared bankruptcy, it was the CFTC
that received most blame. Members of both parties
repeatedly grilled CFTC Chair Gary Gensler and other
agency officials about the missing $1.6 billion. Though
of the actual locus of regulatory failure may have been
elsewhere – or, indeed, nonexistent – the political
pressure landed most heavily on the CFTC.
Accordingly, the CFTC exerted its authority to take
command of the investigation of the incident, which
had previously been conducted by CME, which was
MF Global’s most direct, though not sole, regulator.
CME’s executive chairman, Terrence Duffy, described
the process this way: “In November, the CFTC
requested that CME Group not conduct its own
investigation, but rather take part in the agency’s
inquiry, and since then we have worked together
closely.”138 The implication here is clear: if CFTC is
going to be hauled before Congress to face the risk of
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statutory revision or budgetary pressure for this
perceived failure of regulation, then the CFTC is going
to exert greater control over the regulation. As noted
above, the CFTC is currently studying how to do
precisely that.
6. Public Choice I: The Regulator
Public choice theory suggests that the
governmentalization of financial SROs may also arise
as consequence of political pressures involved in the
allocation of regulatory authority. Assuming a
regulator is interested, at least in part, in maximizing
its own authority and power,139 then its first
preference would be for direct control of the regulated
entities. This arrangement, however, may not be
possible for a variety of practical reasons having to do
with congressional preferences about the efficacy of
self-regulation or the agency in question, the path
dependence of the industry’s development, budgetary
issues, or other factors.140 As trading volumes have
grown enormously (from an average of about 300
million shares per day in 1990 to more than 10 billion
shares per day in 2011),141 for instance, regulatory
budgets and resources have not kept pace.142
Accordingly, the agency’s second-best option
would be for the ability to exert greater control over its
subordinate SROs. This expanded reach would expand
the agency’s control over an industry in which it may
have certain rulemaking authority already. For
instance, substantial SEC resources are spent in
139
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overseeing FINRA and its direct regulation of the
securities industry. In addition, over time the agency
may be relatively confident that it could expand its
influence further by exercising greater authority over
the SRO. For instance, although the blame for failures
such as the Madoff often falls on the SEC, those
occasions also provide the agency with openings for
greater direct and indirect control over investment
advisors. We are, of course, considering a public
choice story. The regulatory agency, starting from a
position of limited control, may use soft power to exert
more and more authority.
The history of the securities SRO offers a good
example of how the locus of regulatory control can be
calibrated to reflect prevailing political views of the
time. When the securities SRO was officially given the
government imprimatur by the Maloney Act of 1938,
SEC authority over the SRO – then still the NASD –
was comparatively weak. For example, the NASD (and
the SRO of the NYSE Exchange) promulgated their
own rules, without much SEC review. This
arrangement was the tradition for decades. But after
the back-office scandal of the late 1960s, Congress
increased SEC authority by adding section 19(b) and
(c) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, providing
that the SEC must approve all SRO rule changes and
may “abrogate, add to, and delete from” any SRO
rules.143 Then after another scandal in the early 1990s
involving industry price fixing, the SEC received more
oversight of the SROs, involving authority over
substantive changes to membership, governance and
various rules and procedures. These are just two
examples of the way in which the regulatory agency in
question, here the SEC, has used perceived regulatory
failures to exert additional control over the SRO. This
process, as described above, is commonly available,
since failures are likely to happen from time to time.
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Note also that similar dynamic may be occurring
at a more granular level. Not only might the SEC as an
entity covet the arrogation of greater authority over its
subsidiary SROs, so too might the officials working
within those entities. Consider, for instance, that the
current Chair of the SEC is Mary Schapiro, who was
appointed to that position from her role as chief
executive officer of FINRA. One can readily appreciate
why high-level officers of an SRO might perceive highlevel positions within the administrative agencies
above them as attractive promotions. History is filled
with provincial governors eager for elevation to
positions within the their imperial metropolises. Of
course, to earn such a promotion, it certainly helps to
be perceived as willing and able to execute the soughtafter office. If one wishes to become the head of the
SEC, success might be more likely with a more
aggressive regulatory track record, even though a
lower profile self-regulatory approach might in fact be
more effective or preferable for the subsidiary.
What, though, of lower-level employees within
these entities, who might be more inclined to migrate
from the SEC to FINRA because of higher privatesector salaries? Such movement might not suggest
that those officers’ goal is to make FINRA more like the
SEC. But that migration would certainly be easier if
the two entities were more similar to one another than
dissimilar. Thus, public-choice effects at the individual
regulator level also offer explanations for why selfregulatory and governmentally regulated entities would
tend to converge over time.
7. Public Choice II: The Compliance Industry
Another public choice dynamic may be at work
within the regulated firms themselves. If there is a
powerful group within a regulated firm that wants, for
its own reasons that diverge from the interests of the
firm or its customers, a more governmental form of
self-regulation, then it will act to enable the process of
governmentalization. Certain constituencies within a
52

BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH
firm may prefer more regulation, more strict or
bureaucratic rules for a given amount of regulation,
and so on. This preference may be in their interest
because it enhances their personal or group interests,
because it means more interesting work, more
budgetary authority, more control, or for other
reasons. We speculate that this dynamic may be at
work in the dramatic growth of compliance
departments over the past two decades in the brokerdealer industry.
Within each broker-dealer there is a group of
individuals, known colloquially as “compliance,” whose
job it is “to supervise the day-to-day conduct of
business unit activities and to have in place policies
and procedures reasonably designed to achieve
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.”144
Compliance typically provides the following functions:
to give advice to business units about rules and
regulations; to develops internal policies and
procedures that help the firm to comply with external
rules; to help train business personnel regarding their
legal duties; to help monitor business functions for
compliance with legal rules; to conduct internal
investigations; to handle licensing and registration of
business professionals; to manage relationships with
regulators; and so on.145 In all of these functions, the
role and importance of compliance, as a stand-alone
function, is greater the greater the amount of external
regulation. Moreover, holding the amount of regulation
constant, the more intense, complex, bureaucratic,
and adversarial the regulation, the greater the need for
effective compliance. In other words, whether
compliance personnel are designing training programs,
offering advice to business units, or handling internal
audits, their importance within the firm is proportional
to the governmentalness of the external regulation.
144
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Where the regulation is aggressive, high risk,
adversarial, and “other” in a sense, compliance is a
more vital function than when the regulation is less so.
Compliance experts are generally relied upon more
under government regulation rather than selfregulation.
Notwithstanding this implicit preference for
more
governmental-like
regulation,
compliance
operates within a firm, and therefore must operate
within the constraints set by the firm. In other words,
firms may recognize this tendency and exert pressure
for compliance to be structured and act in a way that
privileges the interest of the firm (which may be for
more self-regulatory regulation) over the interests of a
particular department.
For several reasons, compliance departments
may be successful at breaching their firms’ constraints
in the long term. First, compliance professionals are
typically siloed in the organizational structure from the
rest of their business to ensure that business interests
or short-term profit motives do not corrupt the firm’s
internal regulatory processes. One industry white
paper, for instance, describes as a best practice
“separating Compliance Department functions from
the supervisory functions of line managers, as well as
distinguishing the roles of the Compliance Department
from other control functions.”146 The logic here is
powerful, since the overlap of regulated and regulator
in a particular firm may give the firm less credibility
with external regulators in the event of an
investigation of the firm. Note, however, that the
compliance subcommittee of the industry trade group,
called SIFMA, wrote this white paper. As such, this
position might simply be an effort by the compliance
professionals to entrench their interests and to protect
themselves from the scrutiny of the broader business.
In either case, compliance is isolated and viewed as a
stand-alone department. From such a position,
146
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compliance may be able to define and to exert its
interests more easily than integrated departments
within a firm. If compliance heads in a direction the
rest of the business finds troubling, the ability to
control it may be limited by concern about interfering –
or appearing to interfere – with legal obligations.
Second, the actions of compliance are likely
difficult and costly for business managers to monitor.
Compliance is largely a legal function, and typical
business managers in a broker-dealer do not possess
similar training or experience. Compliance employees
may use their specialty knowledge, the unique
nomenclature and patois of law, as well as
unfamiliarity with legal process to insulate their work
from rigorous business oversight. The mantra of
compliance professionals – to create and foster a
“culture of compliance” – is consistent with this
account. “Culture” is a particularly malleable and
powerful explanation for a range of activities. Any
pushback on a “culture of compliance,” as defined by
compliance, can be countered with concerns about
legality and a FINRA rulebook that is, as of the 2012
printing, 1374 pages of 8 point font.
Such factors as these might still not permit an
overly independent compliance department, however, if
business managers of broker-dealers found it
worthwhile to invest in disciplining compliance
departments. But there is little reason for a rational
firm to do so. For one, the compliance departments at
all broker-dealers face the same incentives to influence
outsiders setting the rules of the game, and therefore
disciplining only one department would likely have
little impact. What would be needed is a common effort
by all or a critical mass of broker-dealers, which would
be difficult to organize and perhaps subject to
antitrust constraints.
Another reason firms are unlikely to try to
counter the move toward greater complexity and
governmentalization is that all similarly situated
broker-dealers face the same increased cost as a result
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of the change, and therefore no individual brokerdealer would reap any advantage from halting the
trend. All other firms would benefit freely through
such efforts, and therefore no firm has an incentive to
invest in countering the push because of the free-rider
problem. Instead, broker-dealers reasonably may
perceive increased compliance costs as an industrywide tax, which they can likely pass on to their
customers. Any such burden applies to every brokerdealer, and broker-dealers have a monopoly on
executing stock transactions. So long as the firm keeps
compliance costs within the range of competitive firms,
there is no business disadvantage, no matter how
much compliance costs.147
One final point is worth mentioning. For large
broker-dealers, not only are compliance costs of little
harm (if they amount to an industry-wide tax), but
they may be valuable. If the compliance industry
generates a demand for compliance services that has a
large fixed cost per firm, then large firms can use this
“culture of compliance” as a way to reduce the profit of
smaller rivals or to create barriers for new entrants.
Larger firms can spread any fixed costs over a larger
asset base, and therefore bear any costs more easily.
Assume, for example, two firms, one with 100
customers and assets at the firm of $100 each, and
another firm with 50 customers with $100 each.
Further assume compliance costs are $50, plus $2 per
customer. In that case, total compliance costs for the
first firm would be $250, and $150 for the second firm.
As a percentage of assets under management,
however, the first firm’s compliance costs are just 2.5
percent, while the second firms are 3 percent. If the
firms pass on the costs to their customer, the second
firm will have to outperform the first firm by 50 basis
points to offer competitive services.
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Another
source
of
potential
competitive
advantage exists from the development of a “culture of
compliance.” In a business environment in which
returns from investment strategies are increasingly
commodified and asset managers have greater
difficulty
differentiating
themselves,
regulatory
adroitness can itself be a source of competitive
advantage. Perversely, for firms that are particularly
expert at compliance, the larger the burden and
complexity of regulation, the better. A firm with a 10
percent cost advantage on legal compliance can
differentiate itself more if compliance costs are, on
average, $1000 per firm rather than if they are merely
$100 per firm.
Importantly, this observation does not imply or
require any conscious plan on the part of any
individual. The process by which interest groups
protect their interests, expand their influence, and
pursue goals narrowly, while being integrated into a
larger whole is well described in the public choice
literature, and it does not require deliberate action.
Rather, these developments may occur unintentionally
in a manner difficult to observe or to counter in any
individual case, but with substantial consequences
nevertheless.
Anecdotal evidence about the compliance
industry corroborates such observations. Compliance
as a separate function began in the 1960s.148 (Before
this time, compliance with rules and regulations was
the responsibility of each professional broker.
Although this is still true, the responsibility is now
shared with a separate department focused entirely on
rules.) Over the next three decades or so, the
compliance industry remained relatively small, with
even the largest broker dealers employing only a few
individuals devoted to a separate compliance function.
In part, this kind of slow growth can simply be
explained by a rise in the size of the typical firm and
148
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the increasing complexity of its operations. But,
according to interviews with compliance officers at
large broker-dealers, starting in the mid-1990s, the
number of compliance officers began to boom. At one
large broker-dealer, just a handful of compliance
officers worked in 1995, while today there are over 400
individuals. The timing of this explosion corresponds
quite well with our account of the increasing
governmentalization of the SROs for broker-dealers.
The thrust of our argument in this section is simply
that this temporal confluence is not a coincidence, but
rather that the governmentalization has been driven in
part by the private interests of “compliance” within
and across firms, and that this growth creates a
feedback
loop
in
which
the
process
of
governmentalization increases over time. Putting aside
issues of initial causality, once the process starts,
increasing governmentalization begets more demand
for compliance, which in turn fosters an interest in
more rules and more government-like process. Given
the importance of this feedback loop, as in other areas
where feedback is important, the growth of compliance
is unlikely to remain linear. And, in practice, we
appear to be witnessing more explosive growth.
8. Industry Structure
A final potential influence on the nature and
scope of SRO regulation is any change in industry
structure. The nature of the underlying regulated
industry will influence the shape of its self-regulatory
structure, which will in turn influence the relationship
with the government regulator. A consolidated
industry structure, coupled with a single SRO is likely
to lead to a different position vis-à-vis the ultimate
government regulator than a more diffuse industry
with multiple competing SROs. In other words, the
nature of SROs is likely to reflect the fundamental
industry structure.
For example, the government agency may enjoy
more control over a single SRO, since it can devote all
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of its attention to it; the government agency might
have more at stake if there is a single SRO, and
therefore exert more influence on it; the government
agency and the single SRO might work more closely
together, and therefore the SRO might come to look
more governmental; and so forth.
On the other hand, one can imagine that with
fewer options for exit to different SROs, and therefore a
greater stake in the policies of a single SRO, industry
members might have a greater stake in optimizing the
SRO’s policies to meet their needs. While one might
think this influence would be in the direction of a more
pure self-regulatory model, the discussion above
suggests this is not necessarily true. For instance, the
public choice analysis of the compliance industry
suggests that even firms that might otherwise prefer
an SRO model ab initio might come to prefer a QGO
over time. Although without more it is not entirely
clear which way a change in industry structure cuts,
combined with the factors mentioned above,
consolidation
is
likely
to
lead
to
greater
governmentalization.
Over the past several decades there has been
significant consolidation in the securities and
commodities industry. While a full description of this
history is beyond the scope this paper, the point can
be made with some basic facts. There has been
consolidation of the major stock exchanges, with the
New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and CME Group
buying rivals and building international dominance.
The SROs have consolidated as well, with the most
prominent example being the combination of the NASD
(the
regulator
for
over-the-counter
securities
transactions) and the SRO of the NYSE merging in
2007 to create a single securities regulator known as
FINRA.149 A final example of this trend is the recent
congressional command in the Dodd-Frank Act that
certain derivatives transactions be conducted on
149
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centralized clearinghouses.150 In all these cases, the
trend has been toward more consolidation and
centralization, which has the effect of pushing towards
a more governmentalized approach to self-regulation,
under the reasonable assumptions described above.
B. Implications for Other SROs
The mechanisms that transform SROs into
QGOs are not necessarily applicable in every case nor
can they be applied mechanistically. The facts and
circumstances for particular industries and SROs will
determine whether particular mechanisms influence
the nature and scope of regulation, whether a
mechanism or combination of mechanisms transform
an SRO into a QGO, and how quickly any such
transformation will occur.
In the commodities industry, for instance, we
have
described
some
instances
in
which
governmentalization seems to be occurring, but there
may be other factors at work that do not support or
even counteract such a transformation. For instance,
while the securities business has become a more retail
business in which larger numbers of average
individuals are betting greater amounts in an
intermediated way, the commodities and derivatives
markets do not clearly reflect a similar evolution.
Obviously, derivatives have seen huge recent growth:
the total value of all derivatives rose from $5,737
billion in 1990 to an astonishing $687,811 billion by
2009.151 But there is no good evidence to suggest that
retail investors have driven this growth, as they have
in the case of equities. This difference might suggest
less pressure to move to a QGO model in derivatives.
Of course, the commodities industry’s dramatic
increase in size, alone, might suggest more systemic
150
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risks, which may in turn generate more demand for
government-like regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act’s
treatment of derivatives is perhaps one an example of
this sentiment. In addition, a lesson of the 2008
financial crisis may be that average investors are not
the only ones who may need the protections of law,
and thus merely the growth of the industry may be a
factor favoring a more governmental approach to
regulation.
Another element to consider is the relation
between the evolution of various SROs across
industries. The evolution of the SRO in the securities
industry from SRO to QGO might, for instance make a
similar change in the commodities industry more
likely. If FINRA is a viewed as a model for SROs, as its
prominent position among them sometimes suggests,
then as it changes, so too might other financial SROs.
For instance, if an SRO in another industry, such as
commodities or derivatives, experiences a regulatory
failure, whether or not the SRO was efficient ex ante,
then the baseline comparison in terms of regulatory
approach will be with other leading SROs, like FINRA.
Again, perception here may matter more than the
provable linkage between structure and outcomes.
Further more, as FINRA becomes more like the SEC,
the agency may use that transformation as an example
for other financial industries to follow.
Based on our conjectures, we believe that the
process of governmentalization is likely for other
financial SROs. Of course we cannot be certain when
such a transformation will happen, how fast it will
occur, or what the primary impetus will be for the
change, but our prediction is that these factors are a
powerful influence on financial SROs.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING GOVERNMENTALIZATION
In the previous two sections of this article, we first
detailed
the
phenomenon
of
a
growing
governmentalization
of
financial
self-regulatory
organizations and then explored the mechanisms that
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appear most responsible for that transformation. In
this section, we consider the implications of increasing
governmentalization of the SROs in our federal
administrative structure.
Certainly, in light of the performance and popular
depiction of the U.S. and global financial markets over
the past several years, some commentators may
welcome any development that appears to increase the
power of financial regulators, no matter what form it
may take. There is no shortage of critics of financial
regulation generally and self-regulation specifically,
many of whom prescribe just such a greater role for
governmental actors.
Indeed the new millennium’s opening decade
featured a series of high-profile financial scandals and
failures: from the hangover of the bursting
dotcommery to the Enron and WorldCom accounting
investigations to mutual fund market timing
allegations to the mortgage meltdown and its
accompanying 2008 global crisis. Each of these cycles
fostered
public
handwringing,
prosecutorial
investigations, and federal regulatory responses.
Following several decades in which the original four
securities statutes of the Great Depression dominated
the legal landscape, the past ten years alone has given
rise to several new landmark laws: Sarbanes-Oxley,
Dodd-Frank, and the JOBS Act.
State financial
regulators, too, have grown increasingly active in their
investigation of financial dealings: then-New York
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer gained renown as the
Sheriff of Wall Street; today, his successor, Eric
Schneiderman is investigating major financial
institutions for their role in the mortgage debacle.
Given this widespread and popular support for
new investigations, new legislation, and new
regulations to police financial behavior, we would fully
expect at least some constituencies to applaud any
increased governmentalization of financial selfregulatory organizations. In fact, to the extent some
commentators may have believed SROs to be
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intrinsically feeble institutions dominated by their
members, this development may appear simply to be
the necessary and obvious corrective to an inept
original design.
But we urge caution about the increasingly
powerful and governmental SROs. The implications of
this evolution are troublesome, no matter what one’s
disposition towards the regulation of financial
markets. Certainly, those who would prefer fewer
governmental constraints upon the financial markets
are necessarily going to be disappointed with a
significant increase in those constraints. But even
those who welcome new financial legislation should
not embrace greater SRO governmentalization as a
self-evident good without considering what will be lost
by the de facto elimination of true self-regulation in
our financial markets.
We see at least three significant concerns with
ever-increasing govermentalization. First, the loss of
self-regulation prompts a recollection of what the
benefits of self-regulation are and why, indeed, why
the financial SROs were established in the first
instance. In a similar vein, Congress had compelling
reasons to permit self-regulation to co-exist with –
rather than to be replaced by – governmental
regulatory authorities such as the SEC and CFTC.
Second, commensurability in our system of regulatory
authority is a compelling consideration: there are
persuasive reasons to deploy softer power on some
occasions and in some settings, rather than always to
unleash the full power of the state. Third, conversely,
when every organ of our regulatory structure is
imbued with the full authority of the state, then those
citizens and institutions subject to that authority must
be constitutionally entitled to the well-established
panoply of protections that our democracy has long
insured to check state authority.
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A. Losing the Benefits of True Self-Regulation
If financial SROs fully transform themselves
entirely into governmental organs, then self-regulation
in those spheres will be rendered extinct. Any gains
that governmental financial authority brings will,
therefore, be offset by corresponding and potentially
greater losses from the elimination of one of the
financial industry’s oldest tools.
As lessons from
biodiversity, drug-resistant diseases, and one-party
rule teach, systems as complex and multivariate as the
U.S. economy rarely benefit from a reduction in their
diversity. One size almost never fits all, so caution
should accompany any elimination of additional
potential methods of control. As much as anyone
might dearly enjoy chocolate, for instance, the perils of
genetically modifying every plant into a cacao tree are
readily envisioned. If more governmental control of
our financial system is desirable, the devices are
already in place – through existing regulatory agencies
– to ratchet up that control. By converting structures
that were not designed to operate as governmental
actors, the unique attributes of those SROs that enrich
the overall compliance landscape will be jettisoned.
Indeed, the creation and preservation of SROs itself
bespeak faith in their virtues. There are good reasons
why SROs were originally given their jurisdiction, and
they should be considered at a time when SROs may
be facing termination by transformation.
Perhaps, however, one might contend that SROs
have always been a compromise and that any creation
of an SRO necessarily constituted a concession to
overweening industry power. Self-regulation, in such
a view, is in fact the absence of any regulation and is
evidence that the particular industry successfully
rebuffed any oversight of its activities. One would, in
essence, be arguing that all financial operations ought
to be overseen by entirely governmental regulatory
agencies and that anything other than such oversight
is an impotent alternative secured through political
power and impure motives.
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The compelling affirmative attributes of selfregulation must therefore be considered, as these
attributes will be abandoned in a bailiwick patrolled by
only governmental or quasi-governmental authorities.
As a first principle, self-regulation evokes the rich
tradition of order without (or with minimal) law,
explored and extolled in the work of Robert Ellickson
and Lisa Bernstein.
We explore several of those
benefits here.
1. Industry Expertise
Perhaps the greatest single benefit that selfregulation possesses over other forms of regulation is
its access to direct industry expertise. By capitalizing
on the participation of industry players, a financial
SRO can enjoy a greater degree of information and
experience about the way in which financial
transactions are actually performed in today’s
incredibly sophisticated and specialized economy.
Governmental actors, on the contrary, may be so far
removed from day to day operations in this industry
that their knowledge of financial practices may either
be too theoretical or too outdated.
Indeed, one of the chief criticisms that emerged
from post-mortems of the 2008 financial crisis was the
fact that governmental regulators were woefully ill
equipped to understand – let alone to monitor and to
regulate effectively – the complicated financial
machinations involved in, for instance, synthetic
collateralized debt obligations. By more readily
drawing upon the expertise, experience, and
information of the regulated, SROs can reduce falsepositive and false-negative error costs and thereby
reduce
dead-weight
losses
from
erroneous
punishment.
At some level of our overall system, we must be
able to gather information on how finance is actually
practiced in our global economy. By converting SROs
into something else, we risk losing one of our only
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links to this reality and becoming even more ignorant
of the state of the art in financial engineering.
2. Trust between the Regulating and Regulated
As any prosecutor knows, it is far easier to
negotiate with and to monitor the actions of parties
who share a degree of trust.
When an SRO’s
membership and leadership truly represents industry
participants, that trust will be a natural outgrowth of
the familiarity the participants have with one another.
The members of a community are likely to have greater
trust of each other on specific issues than does the
general polity at large. This trust will lead to greater
common ground on issues such as the efficiency and
justice of particular rules, therefore resulting less
disagreement or deviation from expected behavior.
Where local compliance is possible without
compulsion, the costs of governance are reduced.
Conversely, when an entity charged with regulating
and enforcing rules is staffed with people who report to
the nation’s political capital, the distance between the
regulator and the regulated grows quickly.
3. Efficient Enforcement
With expertise and trust naturally comes efficiency
and savings in the cost of operations. When regulators
know more about how a system actually works, they
will be less inclined to waste resources educating
themselves or making errors in regulation. Similarly,
if the regulated parties have faith in those who
regulate them, they may be less inclined to challenge
the process at every turn, to mount full-throated
defenses, or to expend vast resources in checking the
actions of the authorities.
SROs, then, are well
understood to police a far broader swath of activities at
comparably much lower cost.
Similarly, private law is less costly to create and to
enforce in many situations. Almost by definition, the
members of a smaller community, such as a particular
industry or even an individual firm, are likely to share
a greater alignment of interests and to be more
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homogeneous along the dimension in which private
law acts.
4. Regulatory Subsidiarity
The values of benefits such as these are often
considered in the design of large political systems,
such as the European Union and the Catholic Church,
and have long been celebrated through the theory of
subsidiarity. That theory posits that power should
devolve to the lowest institution that is competent to
exercise it.
Through such a federalist process,
authority is kept as close as possible to the
constituency that is being governed.
Private laws, whether they are designed for a
family, a firm, or an industry, can be tailored by
knowledgeable regulators to meet the particular local
circumstances. Government rules, by contrast, more
typically embody a one-size-fits-all nature, and
therefore have the potential to be overinclusive,
underinclusive, or both. For instance, a rule requiring
boards of directors to be a particular size or bed time
to be a certain hour might be optimal on average, but
deviate wildly from optimality in the majority of actual
applications. Private law imposed via subsidiarity may
permit greater opportunity for individual firms or
families to achieve their best local arrangements in
ways that improve the total social welfare. Sometimes
these rules might be broader than governmental law—
as in university rules prohibiting various forms of
“hate” speech—and sometimes narrower—as in private
associations that advocate certain types of religious or
political viewpoints unpermitted in government
settings. This tailoring principle is essentially the
theoretical
underpinning
of
federalism.
But,
government can only be so narrowly tailored, given the
costs of creating and deploying governmental decisionmaking.152
152

For instance, the optimal speed limit likely differs by driver, but this is
(currently) deemed too costly, so local authorities set speed limits by road
section, subject of course to federal oversight and to prosecutorial discretion
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B. Losing the Commensurability of Regulation
Comprehensive mosaics of interlocking oversight
are richest when they most effectively calibrate their
enforcement to the relevant infractions.
In our
political system, we typically prefer traffic wardens to
issue parking tickets, SWAT teams to resolve hostile
domestic scenarios, and the military to defend our
national interests abroad. Our multilayered system of
democracy would suffer gravely from the deployment
of armed forces to enforce the minor ordinances that
govern our quotidian activities.
Similarly, SROs that are truly self-regulatory can
enrich the web of financial regulation by operating as
the constables on patrol, carrying relatively minor
tools to handle lesser infractions with lower stakes.
Their elimination jeopardizes the ability to oversee
minor financial infractions with an appropriately
commensurate response. If the only possible reaction
to a financial transgression is the full force of the
federal
government
or
its
quasi-governmental
equivalent,
we
should
expect
unfortunate
consequences.
First, such an overreaction obviously risks
alienating the governed from their governors. Citizens
– or financial firms in the case of financial SROs – will
quickly lose confidence in the judgment of a system
that cannot discriminate between major and minor
problems. To the extent that participation in SROs is
voluntary – if not technically then culturally – rational
members of SROs will withdraw to the maximum
extent possible from such an out-of-touch enforcement
system. If even the most minor of compliance errors
can escalate into federal enforcement actions, then
financial firms will be hard-pressed to treat their SROs
as anything other than prosecutors who must be
repelled with the maximum legal protections available.

vested in the highway patrol.
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Second, if financial firms are forced into a
defensive crouch and to don legal armor for every
compliance issue, then the costs to regulation are
likely to increase. In such a hostile dynamic, there will
be no such thing as informal enforcement. Just as
mobilizing the military to enforce speeding tickets
would consume vastly more resources than the
occasion warrants, turning every opportunity for
financial compliance into a battle between federal
regulators and private law firms will also require
greater resources. Of course, if greater resources are
used, then fewer compliance matters can be addressed
for the same budget, resulting in the ultimate
undesired
consequences:
increasing
the
governmentalization of regulatory organizations could
lead in a material decrease in regulatory oversight.
Another irony that might flow from the full
governmentalization of SROs could be the realization
subsequently that true self-regulation allowed for
broader and more efficient regulation.
Thus, our
system would attempt in future to reinvent what it had
in the past: an industry-based partnership to monitor
low-level compliance issues.
But, of course,
establishing a new and trust self-regulatory absence
after a wave of governmentalization would come with
substantial cost and effort.
C. The Need for Mandatory Constitutional Protections
Academic commentators and courts have already
noted
that
the
phenomenon
of
increasing
governmentalization of SROs is creating constitutional
problems in the regulatory state. As SROs increasingly
wield the power of the federal government, so too must
they be restrained by constitutional checks on their
authority.
That is, if members of SROs may be
deprived of liberty by an organization that is acting
under the color of governmental power, then they must
also be protected by the constitutional mechanisms
that ensure liberty in our political system.
Maintaining this constitutional balance as SROs grow
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evermore governmental will require modifying our
jurisprudence and, simultaneously, also add to the
costs of this modified system of regulation.
Scholars such as Roberta Karmel have noted that
FINRA’s “increasingly government-like functions and
operations raise the question of what checks and
balances and due process procedures are necessary
for such an SRO to have constitutional law
accountability and administrative law legitimacy.”153
Although there has been some dispute about what
functions of SROs may constitute government-like
activity, there is broad consensus that any activities
that are government-like do in fact trigger the need for
constitutional protections.
Perhaps the threshold constitutional issue that
arises from SROs transmogrifying into governmental
entities is the consequence that such SROs might
enjoy immunity from suit. Indeed, Karmel concludes
that “it would appear that FINRA will not have too
much difficulty claiming immunity for its activities
which would appear to be primarily, if not entirely,
adjudicatory,
prosecutorial
or
regulatory.”154
Obviously, that sort of immunity would greatly alter
the relationship between the organization and its
members, very much to the latter’s detriment.
But, on the member’s side of the ledger, they
might increasingly be entitled to Fifth Amendment
pleas in response to SRO requests for documentary or
testamentary evidence. Naturally, the reticence of
members to cooperate with SRO investigations will
obviously hamper investigations of wrongdoing.
To the extent SROs are governmental entities,
then the targets of their enforcement actions would
also enjoy due process rights that could prove
counterproductive to the SROs. If every entity subject
153
Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin.
151, 154 (2008).
154
Id. at 177.
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to FINRA oversight were entitled to the full panoply of
rights to notice, to statements of the charges against
them, to full representation by counsel, to appeal, and
so forth, then once again the costs of operating in this
mode will increase for SROs.
Indeed, Karmel
concludes that such developments “would probably
ossify the work of the SROs and would not necessarily
be useful.”155
Of course, the transformation to governmental
status does not affect only the regulated but also the
regulator.
SROs that become true government
agencies must themselves abide by the arcane and
bountiful regulations that govern such entities. That
is, they would need to abide by regulations that
constrain the ways in which they hire personnel,
compensate their employees, and conduct their
operations because of the applicability of laws such as
the Freedom of Information Act and Administrative
Procedure Act.
In short, SROs cannot indulge
themselves of the attractive aspects of greater power
over their subjects without themselves becoming
entangled in the web of chains that keep us free.
D. FINRA Rule 2010: An Example
The most powerful and most commonly invoked
FINRA rule is also perhaps the most vague. Rule 2010
provides simply: “A member, in the conduct of its
business, shall observe high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade.”156
Every violation of any other FINRA rule is almost by
definition also a violation of Rule 2010, which raises
the question of why the rule exists.157 One practical
answer is that rule operates to capture conduct that

155

Id. at 186.
FINRA Rule 2010. Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of
Trade,
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_i
d=5504 (formerly NASD Rule 2110).
156

157

Frank Thomas Devine, Exchange Act Rel. No. 46746, 202 SEC LEXIS 2780, at
*21 (Oct. 30, 2002).
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cannot be efficiently or easily proved to violate another
rule, but that FINRA believes is worthy of sanction.
Rules have necessary elements (such as, intent or
scienter or the existence of a particular fact) that
require proof, and FINRA rules are subjected to legal
constraints by the SEC and federal courts.
Accordingly, if FINRA alleges a broker engaged in
“manipulation” of securities prices or illegal “churning”
of a client’s account, FINRA must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that all the elements of
manipulation or churning are satisfied. This
prosecutorial burden is disciplined by the fact that any
member can appeal a FINRA adjudicatory outcome to
the SEC, then to the federal courts, and even to the
Supreme Court.
Proving all the elements of other rules, such as
those proscribing manipulation, is costly and may be
difficult in the brokerage context because of the
ambiguity between desirable/legal conduct and
undesirable/illegal conduct. Manipulation is a good
example. Although it is a widespread belief that
brokers are capable of manipulating prices, and that
their doing so would be a bad thing for investors,
drawing the line between manipulation and more
benign trading is exceedingly difficult. Courts have
struggled to develop workable definitions,158 and
academics have wondered whether any precise
definitions are possible.159 But, FINRA members
charged with overseeing the discipline of other FINRA
members possess an informed experience, which
allows them to identify acceptable and unacceptable
trading behavior at a more impressionistic level.
Proving “manipulation” may be difficult, but brokers
can fairly easily distinguish between good and bad
broker behavior in a particular case.160
158
159

See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, “Should the Law Prohibit ‘Manipulation’
in Financial Markets?,” 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991).
160
The best analogy here is Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity –“I know it when
I see it”—in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring). The problem
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In such cases, Rule 2010 demonstrates its
prosecutorial appeal. The rule allows members
appointed to discipline other members to levy penalties
against brokers who engage in socially undesirable
conduct, which might otherwise be too difficult or
costly to prove violates other, more specific rules. A
general, ethical rule like this is especially important
because brokers with knowledge of other specific rules
can use the specifics as a roadmap to facilitate
evasion. In other words, the vagueness of Rule 2010 is
its power, in that it lowers monitoring and enforcement
costs, as well as provides a broad net to catch bad
brokers who would escape punishment in a more
formalistic environment.
Importantly, a vague, ethical rule like 2010 may
be peculiarly within the power of a SRO to use. To
tolerate the use of such a powerful and ill-defined rule,
members must have faith that the discretion it grants
to those sitting in judgment will be exercised wisely.
Behind the veil of ignorance, self-regulated brokers
might be more likely to agree to be bound by such a
rule than if the discretion were to be exercised by nonindustry members, such as government agents.
Reciprocity might potentially constrain abuse, and
brokers might have greater faith in the expertise of
industry members. Whatever the reasons, the loss of a
powerful ethical rule would increase monitoring,
enforcement, and adjudication costs, as well as the
possibility of greater social losses in the event that
more undesirable conduct will occur.
William Douglas made a similar point in his
famous speech to the Hartford Bond Club noted above.
As Douglas described it, some undesirable conduct is
“too minute for satisfactory [government] control” and
some unethical conduct is lies “beyond the periphery
of the law,” such that it can be reached only by self-

with such vague definitions in specialized areas is that their application by generalist judges
may produce uncertainty in the minds of primary market participants, which results in
increased costs.
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regulation.161 Rule 2010 is an example of this kind of
powerful, extra-legal rule, the absence of which might
undermine the efficient enforcement of broker
behavior.
V. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SROS
If the increasing governmentalization of SROs is a
problem, then what possible means might be deployed
to halt or to reverse the unwelcome progress of this
mutation? At least three different approaches might
be worth considering: directly overturning regulatory
interventions; indirectly addressing the mechanisms
that have led to those regulatory interventions; and
cultivating new mechanisms that may tend to produce
more independent and self-regulatory SROs.
A. Reversing the Series of Regulatory Interventions
First, one might attempt to reinstate the “self” in
self-regulatory organizations simply by imposing
independence by fiat. That is, the Congress or the
relevant administrative agencies could, respectively
enact legislation or promulgate regulation that
insulates financial SROs from governmental oversight.
In essence, this step would involve repealing those
incremental measures adopted (and set forth in
Section II above) over the past few decades that have
most decisively pulled SROs into the governmental
orbit. So, for instance, the composition of SRO
governing boards could be revised to allow a greater
representation of the industries themselves. Similarly,
the mechanisms by which agencies currently approve
or disapprove of regulations and enforcement actions
of SROs could be formally severed.
While this approach is direct and would likely
achieve the most immediate de-governmentalization of
SROs, it suffers for ignoring the cause and effect of the
changes in SROs. As we have shown in this article, a
variety of mechanisms has evolved to generate the
161

See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 186.
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increasing governmentalization of SROs – any attempt
to alter the product of those mechanisms could simply
be reversed once again by the inexorable workings of
those mechanisms in future.
If the political will is not available for these direct
measures, as our survey of the mechanisms producing
greater governmentalization suggests, then a deeper
approach will be necessary.
B. Halting the Mechanisms of Governmentalization
A second approach, therefore, would be to attempt
to effect change at the level of the particular
mechanisms that we have described in Section III of
this article. Of course, this technique would require a
broad variety of efforts, put forth in some unknowable
combination, in order to achieve a satisfying result.
Certain mechanisms, of course, may simply be
beyond any regulatory remedy.
The increasingly
individualistic nature of investors in the financial
markets together with their increasing exposure to
greater losses, for instance, are profound changes
being driven by massive paradigm shifts in our
retirement system. As employers, both public and
private, adopt defined contribution plans in the place
of defined benefit plans, we will continue to see fewer
professionally managed pension plans and greater
numbers of individually managed retirement accounts.
A few prototypes have recently emerged, however, that
might reverse this development. In one such example,
retirees in California are voluntarily enrolling in
private plans that mimic the organizational structure
of pension plans: that is, participants can combine
their private accounts into a greater plan, managed by
professionals, to take advantage of economies of scale
and expertise. To the extent these pilot programs
expand, they could reduce the direct exposure of
individuals to loss and thereby reduce the need – or
perceived need – for greater governmental control over
financial regulation.
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The one-way ratchet mechanisms are extremely
difficult to counteract, inasmuch as they appears to be
driven by psychological heuristics and biases that give
greater attention and weight to failures than to
successes. Since those failures are almost always
more salient to investors, the media, and governmental
authorities, it will be difficult to prevent authorities
from overreacting to them. Of course, these sorts of
overreactions are common across the law, whether it
be shark bites, terrorist attacks, or disease outbreaks:
authorities regularly have their cost-benefit analyses
challenged by rare but dramatic events. One measure
that can be deployed to counter these effects is,
however modest, to draw attention to them. A great
deal of recent psychological literature attempts to
counter deleterious financial decisions primarily by
alerting people to those choices, in the hope that
greater awareness will dampen those effects.
To the extent that individual regulators or entire
compliance industry’s appear to be arrogating power to
themselves
by
promoting
more
governmental
regulation, certain steps can be taken.
First,
prohibitions on the revolving door between industry
and regulation attempt to address this process at the
individual level. Perhaps disclosure measures can be
introduced to compute the additional number of
compliance professionals that any new regulations will
require. Publicizing this number might draw attention
to the ways in which increasingly governmental
regulation benefits the compliance industry.
C. Cultivating Regulatory Competition
A third approach would be to try to foster a market
solution to the problem. If the number of SROs
operating in any particular financial sector could be
increased, then the dynamics of competition might
work to produce something closer to an optimal blend
of “self” in self-regulatory organizations. If any one
SRO were to grow too governmental for the tastes of its
constituency, then that organization would lose
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market share and thereby be disciplined into altering
its approach. Competition, of course, requires more
than one SRO in any given field. Unfortunately, the
costs of establishing SROs are high and, indeed,
possibly prohibitive without governmental subsidy.
According to a report by Boston Consulting Group, the
start-up costs of creating a new SRO might be as high
as $300 million. Indeed, the investment advisory
industry is currently resisting the creation of an SRO
in some part because of the financial burden such a
new institution would impose upon their firms.
Similarly, there might be high switching costs to
members that would prohibit free movement from one
SRO to another, and such movement would be vital to
imposing market discipline upon each SRO. Finally,
there might be a dearth of expertise available to staff
and manage multiple financial SROs across the
economy.
If there is value to regulatory competition, then it
might be worth revisiting the approval of the merger of
the NYSE and NASD regulatory arms to create FINRA.
Efficiency reasons, such as having a single set of rules,
a single enforcer, and so on, justified the merger, and
these are likely real and significant. But there is an
offsetting cost to the consolidation that might have
been underappreciated at the time. If we are correct
that
there
FINRA
is
becoming
increasingly
governmental in its regulatory approach, and if the
costs of this change cannot be checked by an
alternative source of regulatory oversight, then we can
be less confident in the efficiency of the regulatory
model. If a regulator becomes inefficient, for whatever
reason, and the regulated have the choice to switch
regulators, this provides a check on regulatory
overreach. (This is a race-to-the-top story of regulatory
competition, which is not the only possibility.) We
cannot be confident that the problem we’ve identified
in this article would be sufficient to warrant undoing
the creation of FINRA, and we are certain the political
will to do so now is lacking. But if the
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governmentalization of FINRA continues, and some
change is necessary, going back to multiple broker
SROs might be an option worth considering.
But the impediments to increasing competition
amongst SROs domestically do not necessarily rule out
all possible sources of competition. As we have seen in
other financial areas, international markets are a
broader source of regulatory arbitrage. If a greater
array of SROs is desired but unaffordable within the
United States, then Congress and the financial
administrative agencies should permit financial firms
to choose amongst international SROs. As financial
markets grow in size and sophistication in Asian and
European markets, they might produce additional
regulatory – and self-regulatory – institutions that
might carry some of the burden of regulating U.S.
entities. Of course, U.S. authorities would first have to
agree to accede to the authority of those foreign
institutions.
We hope to have provided some
rationales for reclaiming greater self-regulation of our
financial markets, wherever that self-regulation can be
found.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have attempted to enrich the
academic focus upon self-regulation in the U.S.
financial markets.
Notwithstanding the enormous
degree of academic output following the recent
financial scandals and crises, relatively little of that
work has focused upon the actual first point of contact
between financial firms and regulators: self-regulatory
organizations.
Traditionally, Congress and the
financial agencies receive greatest attention, despite
the reality that self-regulatory organizations are the
primary constables on patrol in this field.
Much of the scholarship on self-regulation that
does exist, however, acknowledges that SROs have
along certain axes adopted notably governmental
traits. That work tends to consider the constitutional
implications of such a development, without
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examining why it is occurring. We have attempted to
rectify that oversight by examining why the process of
governmentalization may be occurring and what it is
costing us. Without understanding the mechanisms
that are driving governmentalization, we will have a
difficult time addressing or reversing the process. Our
primary purpose, therefore, has been to explore those
processes in an effort to enrich our understanding of a
phenomenon that is vital to any effort to regulate our
financial system effectively.
We have proposed some possible approaches to
reverse the process of governmentalization in SROs,
directly, indirectly, and through the use of
countervailing market forces, but devising true
solutions will be the charge of future scholarship.
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